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THE GREEN NEW DEAL AND GREEN TRANSITIONS 
Nicholas S. Bryner* 
ABSTRACT 
In February 2019, Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey 
introduced a "Green New Deal" Resolution in Congress, calling for a ten-
year mobilization toward action on climate change, socioeconomic 
inequality, and other issues. A Green New Deal-evoking the language of 
FDR-era policy-envisions a transition to a green economy that is integrated 
with concern for the social and economic welfare of those who are most 
harmed by environmental degradation and those who are most likely to be 
displaced by the reinvention of U.S. infrastructure and energy systems. 
This Article addresses the need for engaging with regulatory transition 
theory in order to assess the legal, policy design, and implementation 
challenges of a Green New Deal. Regulatory transition theory explains how 
economic, legal, and political pressures can lead to policies that are 
counterproductive, unjust, and inefficient. Key examples of this phenomenon 
are found throughout the core U.S. environmental-legal framework, which 
has been plagued by overly generous transition relief in the grandfathering 
of aging infrastructure and through other policies that differentiate between 
"new" and "existing" sources. This history provides important lessons for 
designing a Green New Deal around four principles: equity, efficacy, 
efficiency, and political coalition-building. Some solutions for transitions 
that can be effectively implemented may be intuitive but must overcome 
political economy challenges and legal barriers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the youngest woman ever elected to 
Congress, has captivated a new generation interested in social and 
environmental policy.' One week after her election in November 2018, 
Ocasio-Cortez made headlines by appearing at a rally staged by the Sunrise 
Movement2 outside now-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's office.3 Ocasio-Cortez and 
other Democrats in Congress adopted the activists' rallying cry for a "Green 
New Deal" before and after the 2018 midterm election.4 In February 2019, 
Ocasio-Cortez introduced a Green New Deal Resolution5 in the House of 
Representatives, with the support of a counterpart in the other chamber, 
Senator Ed Markey of Massachusetts-a politician of an older generation 
1. See, e.g., David Remnick, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's Historic Win and the Future of the 
Democratic Party, NEW YORKER (July 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/23/ 
alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-historic-win-and-the-future-of-the-democratic-party (profiling Representative 
Ocasio-Cortez shortly after her victory in the Democratic primary in June 2018). 
2. For a profile on the climate-justice advocacy group, the Sunrise Movement, and one of its 
founders, Varshini Prakash, see Wen Stephenson, Varshini Prakash of the Sunrise Movement on Climate 
Justice, the Green New Deal, and Revolution, NATION (June 4, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/ 
sunrise-movement-climate-change-varshini-prakash-green-new-deal/; see also the Sunrise Movement's 
website, https://www.sunrisemovement.org/. 
3. Anthony Adragna & Zack Colman, Ocasio-Cortez, Youth Protesters Storm Pelosi Office to 
Push for Climate Plan, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/13/ocasio-
cortez-climate-protestors-push-pelosi-962915. 
4. David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOx (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www. 
vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/21/18144138/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez 
[hereinafter Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained]. 
5. Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal, H.R. Res. 
109, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hresl09/BILLS- 116hresl09ih.pdf. 
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who helped lead an unsuccessful push for climate legislation a decade 
earlier.6 
The "Green New Deal" as a phrase is not new,7 but the concept has 
quickly burst onto the political scene-perhaps more so than its proponents 
could have anticipated.8 It has captured imaginations in a landscape where 
media and public alike are searching for a simple, yet overarching, concept 
that defines political priorities for a new generation of leaders, looking 
toward a post-Trump policymaking era. 9 Notably, those who are shaping the 
Green New Deal are young and new to politics-activists who reject the 
political status quo, having been raised in a time when, from birth (or even 
before), climate change has been a recognized problem.' 
Since Ocasio-Cortez took up the mantle of the Green New Deal in the 
House office hallways, countless commentators have scrambled to define a 
scope for what constitutes the Deal and what it represents." The name evokes 
a comparison to the FDR-era New Deal and is similarly based on economic 
intervention to provide employment opportunities, enhance social-safety-net 
programs, and invest heavily in public goods.12 The Green New Deal is a 
reinvigoration of the idea of industrial policy as social policy 3 with an 
6. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) ("An 
act [t]o create clean energy jobs, achieve energy independence, reduce global warming pollution and 
transition to a clean energy economy."). Frequently referred to as the "Waxman-Markey" legislation based 
on the names of the principal sponsors in the House and Senate, the bill was approved by the House of 
Representatives in 2009 but stalled in the Senate. H.R.2454-American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2454 (last visited 
April 27, 2020). 
7. In 2007, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman described a "Green New Deal" as a 
"rallying call" for "a broad range of programs and industrial projects to revitalize America." Thomas L. 
Friedman, A Warning from the Garden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/ 
19/opinion/19friedman.html?module=inline; see also Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, supra 
note 4 (describing the history of the "Green New Deal" phrase over decades, including its use by Green 
Party candidates, President Obama, and others prior to 2018). 
8. See Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, supra note 4 ("There is a sense among those 
involved that they have caught a tiger by the tail."). 
9. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., Meredith Hankins, I've Been Waiting My Whole Lifefor a Green New Deal, LEGAL 
PLANET (Feb. 8, 2019), http://legal-planet.org/2019/02/08/ive-been-waiting-my-whole-life-for-a-green-
new-deal/ (describing what Representative Ocasio-Cortez represents for millennials who support stronger 
action to stop climate change than older politicians). 
11. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
12. See Steven Fraser, The Greening of the New Deal, NATION (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/green-new-deal-history/ (comparing the Green New Deal with 
its namesake and explaining that the Green New Deal is more ambitious in its proposals for public 
investment and social programs). 
13. Robinson Meyer, A Centuries-Old Idea Could Revolutionize Climate Policy, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/02/green-new-deal-economic-principles/ 
582943/. Meyer refers to "industrial policy" as "the set of laws and regulations that say the federal 
government can guide economic growth without micromanaging it." Id. In other words, the government 
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explicit "green" layer to address the transition toward a more sustainable 
economy. 14 
There is no comprehensive, authoritative definition of what constitutes 
the Green New Deal, and it is not the goal of this Article to provide one. 
However, the Resolution introduced by Representative Ocasio-Cortez and 
Senator Markey outlines several key characteristics of Green New Deal 
discourse." At its heart, the Resolution, and the call for a Green New Deal, 
integrates proposals for climate-change mitigation, job security, investment 
in infrastructure, environmental sustainability, and justice for minorities and 
other vulnerable communities.1 6 As David Roberts has written, there are 
"three core principles" that reflect the Green New Deal idea: 
"decarbonization, jobs, and justice." 7 The responsibility to address climate 
change is a central organizing theme, but not the sole target. Proponents 
intentionally placed progressive social and economic policy goals, including 
universal access to health care and job security, alongside environmental 
justice. 1 
actively seeks to influence economic activity in the country through regulation and through investment 
characterized by government spending; however, the government is not engaging in central planning of 
economic activity, and much of the investment may go to stimulate private business or public-private 
relationships in industrial and other sectors. Id. Although the idea of a Green New Deal is dressed in 
"socialist regalia," the economic concept it is built on, and the historical precedent of the post-Depression 
New Deal, suggest a less radical departure from capitalism. Id. 
14. It is perhaps more useful to think of the Green New Deal nomenclature in this way-as a 
"green" variation on the New Deal, rather than a New Deal-like variation of what might fundamentally 
be considered environmental policy. Centrist critiques of the Green New Deal, in lamenting the extension 
of social programs-i.e., "non-climate provisions" into climate policy, misread the context of the 
proposal. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Democrats Need an Ambitious Climate Plan. The Green New Deal Isn't 
It, N.Y. MAG. INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 7, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/democrats-need-a-
climate-plan-the-green-new-deal-isnt-it.html (speculating that the Green New Deal's socioeconomic goals 
would hinder its goal of urgent climate action). 
15. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). I use the term "Green New Deal discourse" to reflect the 
diversity of opinions and viewpoints about how to construct a Green New Deal. Commentators in the 
technocratic political center, such as Thomas Friedman, might describe the Green New Deal as "green 
capitalis[m]," characterized by "free-market competition to ensure that mankind can continue to thrive on 
Earth." Thomas L. Friedman, The Green New Deal Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/opinion/green-new-deal.html. David Roberts, on the other hand, 
has referred to it as "a form of social-democratic populism." Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, 
supra note 4. As I employ it in this Article, Green New Deal discourse is closer to the latter, focused along 
the lines of proposals supported by Representative Ocasio-Cortez, the Sunrise Movement, and other actors 
that have driven most of the media attention since late 2018 on the topic. The defining element in this 
discourse is that it integrates efforts to remedy socioeconomic inequality, environmental pollution, and 
climate change in a push for sweeping policy reform. 
16. H.R. Res. 109, at 5-6 (laying out the Resolution's "Green New Deal goals"). 
17. Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, supra note 4. 
18. The juxtaposition of socioeconomic and climate policy has led conservatives to criticize the 
Green New Deal as the culmination of a leftist ideological project. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, One Cheer for 
the Green New Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/opinion/alexandria-
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The Green New Deal Resolution is a short document that encompasses 
goals for legislation and priorities for government action, rather than specific 
policies.' 9 The Resolution declares a need for action in the context of the 
2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on 
the dangers of global warming beyond 1.5'C above pre-industrial 
temperatures. 20 Although the scope of the Resolution addresses far more than 
climate-change mitigation itself, the climate crisis is clearly a key driver for 
the Green New Deal's ambitious timelines, highlighting the urgency of 
action that would be necessary to avoid the worst impacts of a drastically 
warmed planet.2 ' 
In the months after the Green New Deal Resolution was unveiled, 
conservative media and the Republican Party quickly built opposition to the 
concept.2 2 The opposition took two forms: first, characterizing the Green 
New Deal as a serious, dangerously radical proposal; and second, as an idea 
too crazy to be taken seriously. 23 In March 2019, a floor vote on the 
Resolution in the Senate failed, as Senate Republicans called for a quick vote 
to highlight its lack of support.24 However, the Green New Deal concept has 
ocasio-cortez-green-new-deal.html (calling the Green New Deal "#fullsocialism"). Centrist and left-of-
center environmentalist critiques either agree or see the Green New Deal's socio-environmental 
combination as a tactically unwise distraction from climate policy. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, The Green 
New Deal Is a Bad Idea, Not Just a Botched Rollout, N.Y. MAG. INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 12, 2019), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/green-new-deal-aoc-bad-idea.html. 
19. See H.R. Res. 109 (consisting of 14 double-spaced pages). 
20. Id (opening with a summary of the IPCC report's findings); see also generally 
0 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C, at 177-283 (Valerie 
Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/srl5/ (detailing the risks of global warming of 
1.5 0 C or more, including ecosystem and species loss; increased drought, heatwaves, and flooding; 
declining ocean and agricultural productivity; decreased water and food security; and continuing sea-level 
rise into the next century). 
21. The Resolution's ten-year mobilization period coincides with its call, based on the IPCC's 
report, for "global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 percent from 
2010 levels by 2030." H.R. Res. 109, at 3. 
22. An analysis in March 2019 showed the disproportionate attention paid to the Green New 
Deal on Fox News versus center- or left-leaning networks. Ted MacDonald, Fox News Discussed the 
Green New Deal More Often than CNN and MSNBC Combined, MEDIA MATTERS (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2019/04/09/Fox-News-discussed-the-Green-New-Deal-more-often-
than-CNN-and-MSNBC-combined/223383. 
23. Perhaps no reaction to the Green New Deal by a public official has been as bizarre as Senator 
Mike Lee's speech on the Senate floor in March 2019 with visual aids mocking the idea. See Allyson 
Chiu, A Senator's Argument Against the Green New Deal: A Machine Gun-Toting Ronald Reagan Riding 
a Velociraptor, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/27/ 
senators-argument-against-green-new-deal-machine-gun-toting-ronald-reagan-riding-velociraptor/?utm term=. 
4b6f8eaf49cd (reporting on Senator Lee's effort to lampoon the Green New Deal with a series of posters 
featuring, among other things, Ronald Reagan astride a velociraptor and scenes taken from Star Wars and 
Sharknado). 
24. Dino Grandoni & Felicia Sonmez, Senate Defeats Green New Deal, as Democrats Call Vote 
a Sham', WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/green-new-deal-
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had a significant impact on the 2020 Democratic presidential primary, 
serving as a reference point for 2020 candidates in rolling out their 
environmental, energy, and climate policy agendas.25 
The Green New Deal represents the potential for a new wave of 
environmental law, 30 years removed from the last major reform to U.S. 
environmental law that ended with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.26 
The integration of socioeconomic justice with environmental law provides a 
new angle for drafting and proposing legislation. However, any new law will 
also need to be integrated with old laws and will need to address the ongoing 
implementation challenges those old laws still face.27 
The idea for societal transformation toward a green economy is, by 
design, disruptive. Decarbonizing the power, transportation, industrial, and 
agricultural sectors-while investing in new infrastructure and maintaining 
a commitment to justice and equity-will require massive transitions in law, 
policy, and economic activity. Transitions associated with deep 
decarbonization-such as electrifying transportation, replacing conventional 
fossil-fuel combustion in the electricity sector with renewable or low-carbon 
sources, changing agricultural practices, and rethinking urban planning and 
building design-will necessarily involve massive-scale turnover from large 
capital investments in carbon-intensive infrastructure to either carbon-free or 
dramatically more energy-efficient infrastructure. 28 The Green New Deal, as 
on-track-to-senate-defeat-as-democrats-call-vote-a-sham/2019/03/26/834f3e5e-4fdd- 11 e9-a3f7-
78b7525a8d5f story.html?utmterm=.82df50888782. 
25. See, e.g., Tackling the Climate Crisis Head On, WARREN DEMOCRATS, 
https:/elizabethwarren.com/plans/climate-change (last visited Apr. 27, 2020) (presenting the Green New 
Deal as the centerpiece of Elizabeth Warren's plan for climate action); David Roberts, The 4 Best Ideas 
from Jay Inslee's New Climate Justice Plan, VOX (July 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2019/7/30/20731958/jay-inslee-for-president-climate-change-justice-plan-green-new-deal 
(arguing that Jay Inslee's proposal offers a detailed execution of the Green New Deal); Umair Irfan, Beto 
O'Rourke Now Has the Most Robust Climate Proposal ofAny 2020 Presidential Candidate, VOX (May 1, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18522680/beto-orourke-2020-climate-change-proposal (comparing 
Beto O'Rourke's climate plan to Green New Deal proposals backed by the Sunrise Movement). 
26. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2018)). 
27. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, 
AM. C. ENVTL. LAW. (Mar. 27, 2019), http://www.acoel.org/post/2019/03/27/What-Happens-When-the-
Green-New-Deal-Meets-the-Old-Green-Laws.aspx (noting the challenges that building new energy 
infrastructure faces under the National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and other 
laws). 
28. See generally 2 JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY & RYAN JONES, US 2050 POLICY 
REPORT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), 
http://usddpp.org/downloads/2015-report-on-policy-implications.pdf [hereinafter WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. 
DDPP POLICY REPORT] (examining strategies and investments the United States must make to limit 
warming to 20C or less). This report, which accompanied a technical document outlining pathways for 
decarbonization by mid-century, was prepared as a country-level contribution to the Deep 
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now embraced by Ocasio-Cortez and others, is the first big-picture concept 
for unifying legislative approaches for climate mitigation, adaptation, and 
resilience with the need for community-minded, inclusive policy to ensure 
that the green transition is a just one.29 
In undertaking major economic, social, and regulatory transitions like 
those envisioned in a Green New Deal, policy design must address the 
distributional implications-that is, who and which sectors will bear the 
burdens and costs associated with the transitions. Those who have made 
significant investments in current infrastructure have an interest in protecting 
those investments, wanting to avoid shouldering the cost of stranded assets 
that have become technologically or environmentally obsolete. Policymakers 
who are concerned about overall cost will want to make transitions as 
efficient as possible. Notions of fairness and equity also play a role in a green 
transition in the transportation, energy, and other sectors in determining how 
to decarbonize while enhancing the welfare not only of those who suffer the 
most from environmental degradation, but also those workers and 
communities who may be displaced in a green economy. 
This Article addresses the need for engaging with literature on law and 
transitions in order to assess the legal, policy design, and implementation 
challenges of a Green New Deal.30 Regulatory transition theory explains how 
economic, legal, and political pressures can lead to policies that are 
counterproductive, unjust, and inefficient. Due in large part to these 
pressures, the core U.S. environmental law framework developed over the 
past 50 years has been plagued by overly generous transition relief in the 
grandfathering of aging infrastructure and through other policies that 
differentiate between new and existing sources. 3 ' This history provides 
important lessons for designing an effective and equitable Green New Deal. 
Part I first provides a primer on the Green New Deal, briefly outlining 
proponents' views as to its scope and various broad plans or options for 
pursuing a Green New Deal. A key component to understanding the scope of 
the Green New Deal is a brief assessment of the economic sectors, industries, 
and social groups that are likely to be affected by Green New Deal 
Decarbonization Pathway Project, led by the United Nations' Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network and the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations. 
29. See Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, supra note 4 (summarizing the ambition of 
the Green New Deal as aiming "to decarbonize the economy and to make it fairer and more just"). 
30. I do not intend to make any particular claim in this Article about which specific policies 
should or should not be in a Green New Deal, such as which technologies should be preferred or excluded 
for energy generation. Rather, the focus is on the broad policy goals expressed in the Green New Deal 
Resolution and accompanying discourse, and how policy design can impact the equity, efficacy, 
efficiency, and political feasibility of the major transitions inherent in any notion of the Green New Deal. 
31. See infra Part III. 
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transitions.3 2 This Part further articulates four principles for designing green 
transitions: equity, efficacy, efficiency, and political coalition-building.33 
Part II introduces and reviews relevant literature on regulatory-transition 
theory, including a typology of transition relief. Part III discusses past legal 
and regulatory transitions, using case studies and critiques of previous 
transitions in environmental and energy law and placing them in the context 
of planning and implementing a Green New Deal. Part IV applies these 
lessons and concludes the Article by addressing some additional 
considerations in green transitions law, including how to deal with 
intergenerational concerns and vexing questions of baselines and timescales 
for a global, long-term problem like climate change. The literature on 
regulatory transitions and on environmental policy implementation identify 
a variety of solutions that can be built into Green New Deal-policy 
planning.3 4  Many solutions for transitions that can be effectively 
implemented are generally intuitive but do face significant political economy 
challenges and legal barriers.3 5 
I. GREEN TRANSITIONS: A GREEN NEW DEAL PRIMER 
Since the Green New Deal caught hold as a rallying cry for progressive 
policy near the end of 2018, a wide range of actors-including Members of 
Congress, presidential candidates, governors, mayors, newspaper 
columnists, progressive advocacy groups, environmental non-profit 
organizations, think tanks, and others-have put forward ideas and plans to 
define the scope and objectives of a Green New Deal.3 6 Although these 
visions differ in significant ways, I will refer to the Green New Deal 
Resolution as introduced in Congress,3 7 as well as a policy document released 
32. See infra text accompanying note 75 and Table 1. 
33. See infra Part I.C. 
34. See infra Part IV.A. 
35. See infra Part IV.B. 
36. See, e.g., Renae Merle & David Weigel, Ocasio-Cortez, Sanders Pitch Green New Deal Bill 
for Public Housing, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/ 
13/ocasio-cortez-sanders-pitch-green-new-deal-bill-public-housing/ (reporting on a bill proposed by 
Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Sanders that would make the Nation's 1 million public housing 
units carbon-neutral by 2030); supra note 25 (citing climate action proposals from three 2020 presidential 
candidates); GREG CARLOCK ET AL., DATA FOR PROGRESS, A GREEN NEW DEAL (2018), 
http://filesforprogress.org/ 
pdfs/Green New_Deal.pdf (translating the Green New Deal's progressive vision into a set of policy goals 
and investments). 
37. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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by the group New Consensus,38 as a starting point for understanding the key 
components of any Green New Deal plan. 
A. Green New Deal Goals 
At the core of the Green New Deal is a set of five central goals that 
balance environmental objectives and social- and economic-justice concerns. 
The Green New Deal Resolution describes these five goals, calling on the 
federal government to enact a Green New Deal as follows: 
(A) to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair 
and just transition for all communities and workers; 
(B) to create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure 
prosperity and economic security for all people of the United 
States; 
(C) to invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States 
to sustainably meet the challenges of the 21st century; 
(D) to secure for all people of the United States for generations to 
come-
(i) clean air and water; 
(ii) climate and community resiliency; 
(iii) healthy food; 
(iv) access to nature; and 
(v) a sustainable environment; and 
(E) to promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing 
future, and repairing historic oppression of indigenous peoples, 
communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized 
communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-
income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with 
disabilities, and youth (referred to ... as "frontline and vulnerable 
communities") [.]39 
The Green New Deal calls for a "mobilization" over a ten-year period to 
enact legislation and implement policy changes that will achieve these 
goals.4 0 That mobilization is to be geared toward an extensive list of 
38. RHIANA GUNN-WRIGHT & ROBERT HOCKETT, NEW CONSENSUS, THE GREEN NEW DEAL 
(2019), https:/s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/ncsite/newconesnsusgnd_14_pager.pdf. 
39. H.R. Res. 109, at 5-6. 
40. Id at 6. 
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objectives, including climate and disaster resiliency; infrastructure repair and 
upgrades; zero-greenhouse-gas (GHG) electricity; grid improvements and 
electricity access; retrofitting "all existing buildings" to improve energy 
efficiency; incentivizing low-polluting manufacturing and industry; 
addressing agricultural emissions; "overhauling transportation systems," 
including investment in public transit, high-speed rail, and zero-emission 
vehicles; funding programs that address the "adverse health, economic, and 
other effects of pollution and climate change" at a community level; land-
use-based carbon dioxide (C0 2) removal; ecosystem restoration; hazardous 
waste and other pollution cleanup; and "international exchange of 
technology, expertise, products, funding, and services" to facilitate global 
achievement of Green New Deal goals.4' 
The top-line goal-complete decarbonization to net-zero GHG 
emissions in the United States-and the specificity of the timelines for results 
have been significant points of controversy among climate activists, 
environmentalists, and other climate hawks.42 Some proponents of the Green 
New Deal in the Sunrise Movement,43 and many critics of the Green New 
Deal,44 have assumed that the Resolution calls for particular results, 
including complete decarbonization of the U.S. economy (or net-zero GHG 
emissions) by 2030. This has fueled criticism that the Green New Deal is 
unreasonably ambitious or technically infeasible. 45 Rather than setting 
specific timelines for results, the ten-year "mobilization" can also be seen as 
a timeframe set for actions that transition the economy toward a sustainable 
result, recognizing (perhaps) that different components of the transition may 
take more or less time to accomplish.46 
The Resolution's listing of what goals are part of the Green New Deal 
project is important, but equally important is the description of how the 
policies to implement the goals will be developed. The Resolution calls for 
41. Id at 7-10. 
42. On the term "climate hawk," see David Roberts, Introducing "Climate Hawks", GRIST 
(Oct. 21, 2010), https:/grist.org/article/2010-10-20-introducing-climate-hawks/. 
43. See Irfan, supra note 25 (reporting on the Sunrise Movement's critical response to Beto 
O'Rourke's plan of reducing emissions to 50% of current levels by 2030). 
44. This has been a particularly controversial point. Many critiques of the Green New Deal, and 
some writings in support, have made this assumption. See, e.g., Dan Farber, To Dream the Impossible 
Dream, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 8, 2019), http://legal-planet.org/2019/02/08/to-dream-the-impossible-
dream/. 
45. See Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, The Misguided Idea in the House's Green New Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-26/green-new-deal-
in-congress-has-a-big-flaw (emphasis added) (criticizing the Resolution's call for doing "as much as is 
technologically feasible," but acknowledging that the ten-year national mobilization called for "need not 
be read to insist on immediate action."). 
46. Id 
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"transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with 
frontline and vulnerable communities" and others, "so that all people of the 
United States may be full and equal participants in the Green New Deal 
mobilization" and gain the benefits of living-wage jobs, health care, housing, 
economic security, and "clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, 
and access to nature." 47 
The New Consensus paper from January 2019 lays out the relationship 
between the environmental and socioeconomic ambitions of the Green New 
Deal, explaining the significance of the name: 
The Green New Deal is "Green" in the sense that its aim is to 
modernize our economy comprehensively so that we no longer 
have to poison our environment, subsidize decaying infrastructure, 
and sacrifice poor and working class communities to all manner of 
pollution and environmental degradation, simply to produce 
wealth that benefits a tiny fraction of Americans. 
It is a "New Deal" in the sense that it works on a scale not seen in 
our country since the New Deal and World War II mobilizations-
carefully developed series of historic national projects, conducted 
on a grand scale, that put scores of millions of Americans back into 
productive and high-paying jobs and transformed our economy 
into the greatest engine of production and widely shared prosperity 
that the world had ever known.48 
The comparison to the New Deal brings the idea of transition through 
government action and investment at a nationwide scale.49 Though the Green 
New Deal is billed as a climate change response, to view it only as such 
would be to inappropriately emphasize the "Green" over the "New Deal."o 
It is important to recognize that the original New Deal was deeply flawed 
by the inequity of some of its best-known programs. For example, New Deal-
era banking, credit, and housing policies excluded black Americans from 
many of the programs that created the post-war American middle class." 
Government-backed mortgages, handled by agencies that "redlined" black 
neighborhoods, enabled the construction of white-dominated suburbs.5 2 
47. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., at 10-14 (2019). 
48. GUNN-WRIGHT & HOCKETT, supra note 38, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
49. Id 
50. See id. (emphasis omitted) ("Equity is ... as central to the design and goals of the Green 
New Deal as is addressing the existential threat of climate change."). 
51. Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 887, 889-90 (2019). 
52. Id at 890. 
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Generations later, the impact of these programs is still clearly reflected in the 
wide disparity between the average wealth and assets of black versus white 
households in the country.53 Thus, while Green New Deal proponents draw 
on the rhetoric of the FDR Administration during the Great Depression and 
World War II, they also envision the Green New Deal as the fulfillment of 
the original New Deal's promise for those who were intentionally excluded 
or left behind.5 4 
The remainder of Part I lays out the basic scope of what a Green New 
Deal might entail in achieving the five central goals of decarbonization, job 
security, infrastructure investment, environmental protection, and equity. I 
do not intend to provide any kind of comprehensive view of these topics or 
normative claim about what should be considered within these five goals; 
rather, this overview highlights the types of economic and social transitions 
that these goals would require. 
B. Decarbonization: Social and Economic Transitions in Energy, 
Transportation, Industry, Agriculture, and Land Use 
America runs on carbon. During the past century, we have built cities, 
streets, roadways, and transportation corridors-to move ourselves and our 
goods-dependent on the use of automobiles powered by gasoline." We 
light our homes, power our electronic devices, and keep ourselves cool with 
electricity, the majority of which still comes from fossil fuels.56 We eat meat 
and crops grown in agricultural systems that release methane, nitrous oxide, 
53. See Courtney E. Martin, Opinion, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/closing-the-racial-wealth-gap.html (citing data to 
show that "[tihe median white family has 41 times more wealth than the median African-American family 
and 22 times more wealth than the median Latino family," much of which is attributable to differences in 
homeownership and home values). 
54. See, e.g., GUNN-WRIGHT & HOCKETT, supra note 38, at 5 (describing the potential for the 
Green New Deal to "redeem [the] great promise" of FDR's vision, including the "Second Bill of Rights" 
proposed later in his administration). 
55. For a reflection on the history of development around cars, see Nathan Heller, Was the 
Automotive Era a Terrible Mistake?, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2019/07/29/was-the-automotive-era-a-terrible-mistake. 
3 8 23 56. In 2019, % of U.S. electricity generation came from natural gas, % from coal, and 1% 
from petroleum. Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity in the united states (last updated 
Mar. 20, 2020). 
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and other GHGs,5 7 and we buy and use products manufactured with fossil 
fuels. 
In 2017, the United States emitted 6.457 million metric tons 59 of 
GHGs. 60 Although the United States has reduced emissions from a peak of 
7.37 million metric tons in 2007, a large proportion of the economy, as well 
as millions of jobs, rely directly or indirectly on fossil fuels or other GHG-
emitting industries.6 ' 
Five major sectors account for the bulk of GHG emissions in the United 
States: transportation, electricity generation, agriculture, industry, and 
residential and commercial energy use.62 Transportation overtook electricity 
generation as the country's largest source of emissions, with 28% of the U.S. 
total in 2018.63 While land use change and deforestation are major drivers of 
climate change globally-and land use changes accounted for a significant 
portion of U.S. emissions during past eras, as large swaths of forest were 
cleared-the United States is, in recent decades, a negative emitter of land-
use-change C0 2 , with more trees being planted than cut down.64 
The Green New Deal Resolution does not articulate specific pathways 
for the decarbonization of various sectors of the U.S. economy, and Green 
57. See Stephen Russell, Everything You Need to Know About Agricultural Emissions, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST. (May 29, 2014), https://www.wri.org/blog/2014/05/everything-you-need-know-about-
agricultural-emissions (identifying methane and nitrous oxide as the primary GHGs emitted by agriculture 
and specifying that most methane comes from cattle and most nitrous oxide comes from natural and 
synthetic fertilizers). 
58. For data on the sources of GHGs in the U.S. industrial sector, see Sources of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last 
updated Apr. 11, 2020) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas]. 
59. The figure is measured in CO2-equivalent, to account for CO 2 (responsible for over 80% of 
the warming impact of U.S. emissions), along with methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, sulfur 
hexafluorides, and other gases, some of which have a dramatically higher global warming potential per 
molecule than CO 2. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS 1990-2017, at ES-4, ES-9 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf [hereinafter GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY]. The 
number represents the gross GHG emissions in the United States; net reforestation in the country reduces 
the United States' overall GHG emissions. Id. 
60. Generic references in this Article to "greenhouse-gas emissions" or "carbon dioxide" include 
all recognized and inventoried GHGs, unless otherwise indicated. 
61. See GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 59, at ES-4 (charting emissions by year); id. 
at ES-10 to ES-17 (listing major sources of CO2 and other GHGs). 
62. U.S. EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas, supra note 58. In this categorization, electricity 
generation includes the emissions associated with residential, commercial, and industrial electricity use, 
accounting for them at the point of emissions at the power plant; separate categories for industry, 
residential, and commercial emissions refer to primary energy consumption or other on-site GHG 
emissions. Id. 
63. See id. (reporting that, in 2018, 28% of GHG emissions came from transportation and 27% 
came from electricity generation). 
64. See GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 59, at ES-8 (showing that land-use change is 
a net carbon sink in the United States). 
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New Deal proponents have not agreed on details or priorities about how to 
65 
target emissions sources. However, climate policy advocates, scholars, and 
others have proposed a wide variety of pathways and plans in the past several 
years, outlining the types of changes that could lead to an 80% reduction of 
GHG emissions.66 The purpose here is not to focus on specifics, but rather to 
indicate in broad terms the types of transitions envisioned in any plan 
consistent with the Green New Deal. Whatever its form, the Green New Deal 
will displace significant portions of the economy, replacing that economic 
activity with investment in new transportation and energy infrastructure, 
industrial practices, updates to residential and commercial buildings, and 
agriculture.67 A brief discussion of how communities, employment sectors, 
and industries are likely to be affected by the Green New Deal provides 
necessary context for analyzing how law and policy can impact these 
transitions. 
In 2013, the United Nations' Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN) and the Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (IDDRI, in French) launched a program, the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathway Project (DDPP), under which policy experts in 
dozens of countries have drafted country-level reports analyzing potential 
feasible pathways for decarbonization.6 8 In the United States, a team of 
researchers affiliated with the consulting group Energy and Environmental 
Economics, Inc. (E3), the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and the 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed technical and policy 
pathways reports for 80% reduction in GHGs by 2050.69 
65. See supra Part I.A. 
66. See, e.g., 1 JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY, FREDRICH KAHRL, JACK MOORE, 
ANDREW D. JONES, MARGARET S. TORN & HAEWON MCJEON, US 2050 TECHNICAL REPORT: PATHWAYS 
TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (Revision with Technical Supp. 2015), 
https://usddpp.org/downloads/2014-technical-report.pdf [hereinafter WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP 
TECHNICAL REPORT] (proposing a plan to attain an 80% reduction in GHG emissions from their 1990 
level by pursuing "(1) energy efficiency, including improved equipment and building envelopes; (2) fuel 
switching, including electrification and a shift to lower net C02 gas and liquid fuels in end use sectors (3) 
decarbonization of energy supplies"). 
67. See infra text accompanying note 75 and Table 1. 
68. About, DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, http://deepdecarbonization.org/about/ 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2020) (providing reports for Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States); see also WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 1 (stating 
that the collaboration began in the fall of 2013). One of the main directors of the project has been renowned 
development economist Jeffrey Sachs. Id. at i. 
69. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 66; WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. 
DDPP POLICY REPORT, supra note 28. Both reports are available at Countries: United States, DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, http://deepdecarbonization.org/countries/#united-states (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2020). Although the Green New Deal calls for full decarbonization, rather than 80% 
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The U.S. DDPP reports in 2014 and 2015 concluded that this level of 
decarbonization is "technically feasible" but requires a "transformation of the 
U.S. energy system," allowing for a few different combinations of choices 
about technologies. 70 The report focuses on three major transitions: 
(1) dramatic increases in energy efficiency in buildings, transportation, and 
industry; (2) full conversion of the electricity-generating sector to zero-GHG 
sources; and (3) switching from gasoline to electricity in transportation and 
from fossil fuels in other end-use sectors (such as industry, residential 
heating, etc.). 
Because the DDPP report focuses primarily on CO 2 from fossil-fuel use, 
it does not specifically address transitions that would be needed to reduce 
other GHGs. 72 Mitigation of CO 2 would also modestly reduce some other 
GHG emissions. 73 Transitions in agricultural, forestry, and land-use practices 
are also critical to any overall national decarbonization strategy. 74 
All of these broad transitions, by definition, will displace a variety of 
communities by significantly altering employment patterns, and will 
introduce costs that-without legal and policy changes in managing the 
transition-are likely to disproportionately impact poor and marginalized 
communities. 75 
reduction, the DDPP report includes a wealth of detail and modeling that is useful in envisioning the 
technical requirements and policy implications for any significant cut in GHG emissions. See id. 
70. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 8,69. 
71. Id at xiv. 
72. See id. at 49-55 (describing a model for reduction of GHGs other than CO 2 and for CO 2 
emissions from forestry and land-use change). 
73. For example, reducing demand for natural gas-a CO 2 source when it is burned-also leads 
to a reduction in the amount of methane, another GHG, that leaks directly into the atmosphere during 
natural gas production. See id. 
74. See Aashna Aggarwal, Danielle Arostegui, Kendall DeLyser, Bethany Hewett, Emily 
Johnson & Alexander Rudee, Achieving the Mid-Century Strategy Goals for Deep Decarbonization in 
Agriculture andForestry (Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper No. NI 
WP 18-02, 2018), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/achieving themid-
century strategy goals for deepdecarbonization web.pdf (examining decarbonization strategies for 
agriculture and forestry policy). 
75. See infra Table 1. 
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Table 1. Illustrative impacts of transitions associated with decarbonization 
ulosmg coal-trea anad LOSS ot power plant Lower polution ieveis 
natural gas-fired power operation jobs for nearby communities 
plants 
Reduced demand for coal Loss of coal mining and Reduced health impacts 
processing jobs for coal sector 
employees; lower 
pollution and localized 
environmental impacts 
from mining 
Reduced demand for Loss of jobs in natural Lower pollution and 
natural gas gas exploration, localized environmental 
production, processing, impacts from resource 
and transportation extraction, processing, 
sectors and transportation 
Construction of wind, Localized Increased employment 
solar, and other zero-GHG environmental impacts in construction, 
power from construction and installation, and 
operations, as well as maintenance 
on-shore and off-shore 
transmission 
infrastructure; potential 
increase in electricity 
prices 
Fuel Switching in Transportation nd Other Sector 
Switching from gasoline- Potential displacement Lower air pollution 
powered to electric of jobs in auto levels in cities and areas 
vehicles manufacturing, at car with high concentration 
dealerships, car repair of vehicles; economic 
shops, gas stations and savings in vehicle 
related transportation operation and 
infrastructure; higher maintenance 
up-front costs for 
vehicles 
Fuel switching in Cost of replacing Decreased 
residential and appliances, HVAC environmental and 
commercial buildings systems, etc. safety risks from 
distribution of natural 
gas and other fuels 
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Buildout of transit systems High up-front cost of Availability of 
construction transportation options, 
facilitating employment 
and economic activities; 
reduced local pollution 
from personal vehicles 
Changes in urban More intense use of Increased livability and 
development patterns some urban areas walkability of 
(smart growth) neighborhoods; lower 
transportation demand 
Decarbonization/fuel Displaced or lost jobs; Lower localized and 
switching in industry increased cost regional pollution from 
industrial emissions; 
new employment in 
low-carbon industrial 
processes 
Energy Efficiency Iniprovenients 
Energy efficiency Higher construction New employment in 
construction and retrofits costs; cost of construction and 
(residential, commercial, retrofitting retrofitting; cost savings 
and industrial) from reduced energy 
demand 
Reducing GHG Emissions from Agriculture mul Otier Sectors 
Transition to low- Displaced or lost jobs; New employment in 
methane, low N20, and increased food prices different agricultural 
low-CO2 agricultural practices and processes; 
practices reduced localized 
environmental impacts 
(e.g., water pollution) 
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Table 1 lists as illustrative examples some of the impacts that would be 
likely to occur in the major transitions associated with decarbonizing the U.S. 
economy. These impacts are listed in broad terms and are not comprehensive, 
but rather provide a starting point for understanding the "winners" and 
"losers" from climate policy. The contribution of Green New Deal discourse 
is its explicit recognition that no serious climate policy can be neutral in its 
socioeconomic impacts, which leads to the Green New Deal's focus on 
addressing those impacts purposefully and simultaneously with climate 
mitigation.76 
Sociological, political, and legal literature on just transitions connects 
labor and environmental concerns by examining the social and economic 
consequences of environmentally-motivated transitions.7 7 More recently, 
commentators and scholars have referred to just transitions specifically in the 
context of climate change and the intergenerational concept of sustainable 
development, given the wide-ranging impacts and displacements inherent in 
comprehensive climate policy (as indicated in Table 1).7' Ann Eisenberg's 
recent work on this subject clarifies the concept, defending just transition as 
a legal principle-with origins in the labor movement-that can "serve 
principles of economic equity, . . . make climate reform more achievable 
through coalition-building, and . .. bring environmental law more in line 
with the needs of the climate era." 79 
Political rhetoric and media narratives frequently highlight the impact of 
climate-related transitions on fossil-fuel sector employment-particularly in 
the coal industry.o For coal-mining communities in the Appalachian region, 
76. See GUNN-WRIGHT & HOCKETT, supra note 38, at 9 ("Deciding who can participate in the 
Green New Deal means .... deciding who can benefit from the economy and who cannot; who can 
transform income into wealth and who cannot; and whose children will prosper in the next generation and 
whose will not."). 
77. See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 285-89 (2019) 
(surveying prior work on just transitions, beginning with labor activism on environmental issues for 
workers and continuing in various fields of social-science scholarship). 
78. For example, in 2012, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) 
used "green economy" as one of the conference's organizing themes. Global institutions picked up on the 
concept as a way to emphasize the economic challenges and opportunities associated with sustainable 
development. The Rio+20 Conference's outcome document itself uses the phrase "green economy" 23 
times. G.A. Res. 66/288 (July 27, 2012). 
79. Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 329. 
80. In July 2019, the sixth-largest coal company in the United States, Blackjewel, ceased 
operations at its mines in Harlan County, Kentucky; miners employed by the company camped out on 
train tracks to block coal shipments to protest the company's failure to pay them for the last few weeks of 
work they performed before the mine closures. Chris Kenning, "We Just Want Our Back Pay ": Busloads 
of Angry Laid-off Kentucky Coal Miners Head East, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/money/companies/2019/08/04/kentucky-coal-miners-blocking-
train-busing-west-virginia-pay/1902073001/. 
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the transition began decades ago, as coal production shifted toward higher-
yielding areas in Wyoming and elsewhere.' The declining cost of natural gas 
and renewables that compete as electricity sources, together with increased 
regulation and environmental enforcement, have accelerated the decline of 
coal sector employment.8 2 
Rapid growth in unconventional oil and gas development, as well as the 
building out of renewable-energy infrastructure, have created new 
employment opportunities at the same time that coal mining jobs disappear.83 
However, the benefits of this transition (some of which have mixed or 
negative environmental impacts in comparison to other energy and resource 
extraction activities) flow to different geographical areas and to different 
communities. 4 
81. In 2017, 40% of U.S. coal was produced in Wyoming significantly more than the 26% 
from the Appalachian region of Alabama, Eastern Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. Coal Explained: Where Our Coal Comes From, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=coal where (last updated Nov. 13, 2019). 
Wyoming's massive share of the nation's coal was produced by only 5,700 miners- 11% of the country's 
employed miners. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2017, at 27 tbl.18 (2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/archive/05842017.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2017]. 
82. U.S. Department of Labor statistics show a nationwide decline from roughly 175,000 people 
employed by coal-mining companies in 1985 to 80,000 in 2010, followed by a further decline to record 
lows around 50,000 jobs from 2016 to 2019. The Department's month-by-month data is available at BLS 
Data Viewer, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CES 1021210001 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2020). More information on the coal sector is available in the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration's Annual Coal Report-visit https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/ to access the 
most recent report. While different organizations' counts of sector-wide employment differ, depending on 
what is included (e.g., employment in coal-fired power-plant operations, etc.), the trends show similar 
declines. E.g., U.S. Labor Department: Coal Mining Employment Fell to Record Low in 2018, INST. FOR 
ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Feb. 5, 2019), http://ieefa.org/u-s-labor-department-coal-mining-
employment-fell-to-record-low-in-2018/ (citing a record-low, nationwide figure of 80,778 people 
"employed by mine operators and contractors"). 
83. See, e.g., Naveena Sadasivam, Oil and Gas Emissions Are Reversing Progress from Coal's 
Decline, GRIST (Jan. 8, 2020), https:/grist.org/energy/oil-and-gas-emissions-are-reversing-progress-
from-coals-decline/ (contrasting the growth and investment in oil and natural gas plants with the decline 
in coal production and generation); Silvio Marcacci, Renewable Energy Job Boom Creates Economic 
Opportunity as Coal Industry Slumps, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energy 
innovation/2019/04/22/renewable-energy-job-boom-creating-economic-opportunity-as-coal-industry-
slumps/#4ec6226b3665 (contrasting renewable energy's recent boom in production and employment with 
coal's decline). 
84. Unconventional oil and gas production has been highest in oil-shale basins, including in 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas; wind and solar energy development has been concentrated in 
particular states due to a combination of both geographic and policy favorability. See Natural Gas 
Explained: Where Our Natural Gas Comes from, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/ 
energyexplained/natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php (last updated Nov. 13, 2019) 
(mapping natural gas extraction in the United States); Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained: 
Where Our Oil Comes from, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-
petroleum-products/where-our-oil-comes-from.php (last updated Mar. 30, 2020) (mapping oil extraction 
in the United States); Solar Explained: Where Solar is Found and Used, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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Asymmetries in the costs and benefits of policy changes-such as these 
described above-are pervasive in climate and environmental policy. 
Opponents of environmental regulation frequently raise the specter of lost 
jobs, economic hardship, and financial burdens as an objection to major 
changes." In response, advocates for renewable energy, green infrastructure 
development, and other climate-related measures-in addition to or in place 
of environment-based arguments-often frame the benefits of these 
transitions in terms of employment impacts.8 6 In the early years of the Obama 
Administration, the President and senior officials leaned heavily on this 
rhetoric in pushing for energy- and environment-related investments in the 
economic stimulus package that was enacted in February 2009.7 For three 
years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics tracked "green jobs" as a category, 
including "jobs in businesses that produce goods and provide services that 
benefit the environment or conserve natural resources," as well as "jobs in 
which workers' duties involve making their establishment's production 
processes more environmentally friendly or use fewer natural resources."8 
However, the Bureau discontinued this categorization under budget cuts in 
2013.89 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of green jobs as a response to anti-
regulatory criticisms at a macro level, the idea by itself fails to engage with 
the local displacement of jobs that are not so easily translatable into new 
opportunities. As posited in Table 1, local communities and workers 
experience environmental benefits when a refinery or coal mine closes; 
however, without some policy effort to smooth the transition or redistribute 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/solar/where-solar-is-found.php (last updated Apr. 2, 2020) 
(mapping solar power in the United States); Wind Explained: Where Wind Power is Harnessed, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/wind/where-wind-power-is-harnessed.php 
(last updated Mar. 24, 2020) (mapping wind power in the United States). 
85. Examples of this rhetoric are too frequent to track. In President Trump's July 2019 address 
on environmental issues, he argued that the Green New Deal would "kill millions of jobs" and placed 
environmental protection and jobs in opposition to one another with the line: "We will defend the 
environment, but we will also defend American sovereignty, American prosperity, and we will defend 
American jobs." Remarks by President Trump on America's Environmental Leadership, WHITE HOUSE 
(July 8, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-americas-
environmental-leadership/. 
86. See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Where Have All the Green Jobs Gone?, NATION (Apr. 22, 2014), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/where-have-all-green-jobs-gone/ (describing the promise ofgreenjobs 
during the Obama Administration and under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009 and 
referring to earlier hopes of a "Green New Deal" at the time). 
87. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. See 
Chen, supra note 86 (recalling the promise that the stimulus package would create green jobs). 
88. Fact Sheet-Jobs in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (2015), ENVTL. & ENERGY 
STUDY INST. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-jobs-in-renewable-energy-and-
energy-efficiency-2015. 
89. Id. 
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benefits, that positive impact is offset at the local level by job losses and 
secondary economic impacts on businesses and industries that rely on the 
presence of now-displaced workers.90 
This same dynamic-with concerns over distributive justice-plays out 
in various other sectors that could be affected by a Green New Deal and 
associated transitions. For example, switching from gasoline-burning cars to 
electric vehicles (as well as fuel efficiency improvements) provides climate 
benefits as well as health benefits in communities near highways or in cities 
with high smog levels; however, increased up-front costs of purchasing new 
vehicles are a heavier burden for low-income households. 9' The disconnect 
between benefits and burdens illustrates the point: climate policy cannot be 
socially neutral. Because it will induce transitions, climate policy has the 
potential to exacerbate existing rural-urban, racial, gender, and wealth 
disparities without intervention to manage those transitions. 
C. Four Principles for Green Transitions 
In light of the overarching goals for a Green New Deal-integrating 
action for environmental and climate sustainability into programs for social 
equity and development 92 -this Article proposes four principles to evaluate 
green transitions and the way in which law and policy might affect them. 
First, in the context of the above discussion on distributive justice, equity 
ought to animate and drive transition-policy design as a first-order concern, 
both in terms of who bears the costs of transitions, as well as who bears the 
burdens of climate and environmental impacts. Second, policies should be 
measured on effectiveness, or rather, the extent to which they accomplish 
transition objectives. Third, and relatedly, the efficiency of policy is 
important. Although economic cost ought not be considered in isolation of 
other factors, conserving resources allows for further investments in 
transition policy. 
The fourth principle is the consideration of political feasibility. The legal 
and policy tools that policymakers choose in designing transitions will affect 
90. In an interview, one of the Kentucky coal miners protesting the lack of pay from Blackjewel 
after it declared bankruptcy put it this way: "Job training would be great, but you could have all the training 
in the world and if there's not jobs here, we have to move away." Sarah Lazare, Kentucky Coal Miners 
Are Blocking a Coal Train for Back Pay. We Talked to One About a Just Transition, IN THESE TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2019), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/22005/kentucky-coal-miners-blackjewel-block-train-
climate-justice-just-transition. 
91. PUGET SOUND CLEAN AIR AGENCY, FACILITATING Low INCOME UTILIZATION OF ELECTRIC 
VEHICLES 1 (2018), https://pscleanair.gov/DocumentCenterNiew/3638/Community-Electric-Car-Sharing----
Executive-Summary?bidld=. 
92. See supra text accompanying note 39 (quoting the goals from the Green New Deal 
Resolution, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019)). 
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the constituencies that will support those transitions. This principle is 
important, not just in evaluating the prospects for enacting reform, but also 
for reasons of path dependency: coalition-building in policy design can help 
make law "stick" by facilitating implementation and reducing economic or 
3 political incentives for backlash against the policy. 9 Well-designed 
transition policy is self-reinforcing, creating a greater likelihood of continued 
reform in the future, rather than less. 
With these framework principles in mind, the next Part turns to examine 
regulatory transition theory as a method for explaining, as a descriptive 
matter, how and why legal and regulatory transitions occur in practice and 
how policy design influences the transition process as well as transition 
outcomes. Following this theoretical introduction is an analysis of previous 
changes in environmental law and policy as examples.94 Applying the 
framework of principles for green transitions to historical examples 
highlights the successes as well as the failures of those changes. Placing them 
within the context of regulatory transition theory affords an opportunity to 
understand why transitions fail and how a Green New Deal can lead to more 
equitable and lasting outcomes. 
II. REGULATORY TRANSITION THEORY 
Times change, as do laws and regulations. Major economic transitions 
can occur with or without the influence of law and policy. For example, 
scarcity of resources, technological developments, demographic shifts, or a 
variety of other causes may drive change that makes types of economic 
activities obsolete.95 During any period of change, decisionmakers may alter 
laws or policies in order to meet their priorities for managing an ongoing 
transition.96 
When policy changes are intended to force or shape economic or social 
transitions, policymakers also face the challenge of addressing foreseen 
transitions-and the expected economic and social costs-before they 
93. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 312 (arguing that environmentalists might have more success 
achieving climate and environmental action if they join forces with labor advocates). 
94. See infra Part III. 
95. See John M. Anderies, Economic Development, Demographics, and Renewable Resources: 
A Dynamic Systems Approach, 8 ENV'T DEV. ECON. 219, 219 (2003) (exploring the causes of economic 
transitions). 
96. Id. 
745 2020]1 Green New Deal and Green Transitions 
occur.9 7 Regulatory transition theory provides a model for explaining how 
lawmakers and regulators manage these transitions.98 
Transitions occur in every type of regulation and in every regulated 
sector. Economic scholarship on legal transitions has focused on how 
regulators allocate economic costs.99 For example, tax policy scholarship has 
specifically addressed one type of regulatory transition-i.e., changes in the 
rates, categories, or applicability of taxation-and the associated financial 
impacts and changes in incentives.' 00 Environmental law scholarship, in turn, 
has addressed some of the economic implications of transition policy, giving 
particular attention to the Clean Air Act.'0 ' Less attention in environmental 
scholarship has been paid to policies intended to address the social impacts 
of transition policy, including the disruption of communities that rely on 
regulated industries directly and indirectly for employment.1 0 2 
This Part sets out an overview of the literature of regulatory transition 
theory in order to highlight its relevance to Green New Deal discourse. Prior 
experiences demonstrate valuable lessons about how to make environmental 
policy transitions consistent with the four principles identified earlier-how 
to make legal changes equitable, effective, efficient, and politically 
feasible.' 03 Several elements are important, including a typology of transition 
relief to complement policy change,1 0 4 a discussion of the problems 
associated with transition relief, drawing on political economy scholarship 
97. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 321-22 (analyzing conditions, like foreseeability, that justify 
active intervention to ease economic transitions). 
98. What I refer to in this Article as "regulatory-transition theory" is, specifically, focused on 
understanding transitions when there is a regulatory change intended to drive that transition. 
99. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 509 (1986) (arguing that the market offers the most efficient method for allocating the risk involved 
in legal transitions). 
100. See generally, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000) (examining transitions in the 
area of federal income tax law); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case ofRetroactivity in Income 
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977) (analyzing the effect of retroactivity and grandfathering in 
tax-law changes). 
101. See, e.g., Bruce Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
91, 114-21, 126-30 (2011) (providing a case study of transition relief under the Clean Air Act's regulation 
of heavy-duty diesel engines); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and 
Environmental Regulation the Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 
1724-32 (2007) (looking at the economic consequences of grandfathering in the Clean Air Act); Robert 
N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 49-56 (2006) 
[hereinafter Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation] (analyzing automobile emissions standards and 
stationary source regulation under the Clean Air Act). 
102. Ann Eisenberg's recent article begins to fill this gap by explicitly analyzing the connection 
between labor and environmental interests in managing transitions. Eisenberg, supra note 77. 
103. See supra Part I.C. 
104. See Huber, supra note 101, at 96-107 (identifying the types and subtypes of transition relief); 
see infra Part IIA. 
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and public choice theory,'o and an evaluation of proposed solutions to these 
transition problems.10 6 
A. Types of Transition Relief 
Bruce Huber divides transition relief in environmental regulation into 
two categories: temporal and financial.' 7 Temporal relief distinguishes 
regulated entities, sources, or individuals based on the timing of some 
action-past, present, or future.'0o Typically, it either postpones or waives 
the application of a new requirement for sources, assets, or rights that existed 
or were already held prior to the legal or regulatory change.' 09 Temporal 
relief may range from short-lived, defined grace periods, to permanent, full 
grandfathering that exempts an existing class of sources."o It may also 
include regulation that is set to phase in at a uniform or rotating timetable or 
schedule, as well as changes that kick in with a triggering event."' 
Environmental, public lands, and natural resources laws are filled with 
instances of temporal transition relief, frequently distinguishing between new 
and existing sources and grandfathering previously existing uses or rights.112 
Policies may also provide temporal transition relief in a variety of other 
contexts, such as zoning, land-use regulation, and building construction 
standards.1 " 
Financial relief, on the other hand, involves direct or indirect 
compensation to regulated parties in order to facilitate or ease the burden of 
new compliance requirements.11 4 Governments may provide tax subsidies to 
incentivize capital investments or changes in behavior or economic activity; 
loan guarantees or grants for building or maintaining infrastructure; or 
indirect financial subsidies, such as allowances for use in environmental 
compliance markets."' 
105. See infra Part 1I.B. 
106. See infra Part 1I.B. 
107. Huber, supra note 101, at 95. 
108. Id at 96. 
109. Id at 95. 
110. Id at 96. 
111. Id 
112. See, e.g., Stavins, Vintage-DifferentiatedRegulation, supra note 101, at 36 (including a table 
with examples from the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, hazardous waste 
management requirements, and California state motor-vehicle-emissions standards). 
113. Huber, supra note 101, at 98-99. 
114. Id at 101. 
115. See id. at 10 1-03 (providing examples of financial relief, including subsidies to farmers who 
put tillable land in the Conservation Reserve Program; grants to help public water systems comply with 
Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act treatment standards; and credit allowances for existing 
sources in a cap-and-trade system). 
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These types of relief may be used individually or in combination. For 
example, financial relief policies may include a sunset or phase-out 
provision, creating a time limit to the benefit;11 6 conversely, grace periods or 
temporary grandfathering may come with some financial assistance to 
promote compliance before the extended deadline is reached." 7 Furthermore, 
as Huber discusses, policymakers can use both temporal and financial 
transition policy in the opposite direction by imposing retroactive liability, 
taxes, or charges, in order to recover costs associated with activity prior to 
the legal change."' 
The Green New Deal expands the frame of reference for these types of 
transition relief. Transition policy focused on regulated industries-on the 
temporal or financial relief directly provided to regulated parties-obscures 
the range of policy options for addressing other types of impacts caused by 
legal or regulatory changes." 9 Regulatory transitions can lead to significant 
labor displacements when manufacturing facilities, mines, power plants, or 
other large employers close or move their operations; these changes also 
indirectly impact service industries and other sectors in surrounding 
communities that once supported the now-displaced workers.1 20 Labor-
centered transition relief, then-whether in delaying or phasing in the 
applicability of new regulations, or in providing financial or other resources 
in relief-places social and human elements of transition at the forefront and 
is an essential component of equitable transition policy. Previous experiences 
in the United States with labor-centered transition relief include, for example, 
direct financial grants to workers, unemployment benefits, job training, and 
relocation assistance.121 
116. Id. at 103-04. 
117. Id. at 98, 103. 
118. See id. at 105-07 (discussing retroactive liability under CERCLA and surface-coal-mining 
fees as examples). 
119. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 292-94 (identifying sustainable development and 
environmental justice as lenses that could help policymakers address environmental externalities). 
120. In at September 2019 event hosted by the University of Pennsylvania, when Rhiana Gunn-
Wright of New Consensus was asked what single element of a Green New Deal she considered "non-
negotiable," her response was "workforce development." Rhiana Gunn-Wright, New Consensus, Panel at 
University of Pennsylvania McHarg Center Event: Designing a Green New Deal, at 5:34:05 (Sept. 13, 
2019) (video available at https://vimeo.com/359778899). Her focus on the worker side of decarbonization 
reflects the commitment to integrating equity, effectiveness, efficiency, and political feasibility in policy 
design. As articulated by Green New Deal supporters, labor transition policies are essential, not only to 
provide justice for those displaced from carbon-intensive jobs, but to ensure the availability of a trained 
workforce needed to fill the jobs in different sectors associated with decarbonization. 
121. See Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 315 (describing several examples of labor transition relief 
policies under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program). 
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B. Deconstructing Transition Policy 
In legal and economic literature, scholars have identified several 
explanations for transition relief policy.1 22 In industrial settings, three of 
those include: (1) an economic conclusion that employing temporal relief 
policies (applying regulation only to new sources) will lower the overall up-
front cost of the regulatory transition; (2) concerns of "fairness" in applying 
regulation to sources, assets, or practices already in operation, relying in 
some instances on assumptions based on the prior regulatory environment; 
and (3) an observation that transition relief will generally make a regulatory 
change more politically palatable.1 23 As Stavins has noted, "[b]oth regulated 
constituents and legislators have very strong incentives to favor" policies that 
differentiate between new and existing regulated units.1 24 
Working through these three explanations-factors that motivate and 
incentivize transition relief-helps identify and expose the economic, social, 
cultural, and legal problems that transition relief policies can also create.1 25 
Each of these factors can blunt the effectiveness of a regulatory change and 
can lead to further opportunities for rent-seeking that undermine the 
efficiency and equitability of the changes.1 2 6 Thus, although these drivers 
facilitate transitions, they may also, depending on how the policy is designed, 
make regulatory transitions slower, more expensive, and less equitable. 
Recognizing the existence of these factors and the ways in which they 
undermine transitions is important in designing a Green New Deal. 
First, the economics of construction will often dictate that it will be 
cheaper to install or manufacture new capital assets, pollution control 
equipment, or products to meet new, more stringent regulations than to 
renovate or retrofit existing stock or products.1 27 For example, if a new 
regulation calls for pollution control equipment for motor vehicles, on a per-
car basis it will be cheaper to install the equipment during the manufacture 
and assembly process rather than recalling and retrofitting cars. Temporal 
transition relief policy can exempt cars currently on the road (requiring them 
122. See, e.g., Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 32-35 (offering 
alternative explanations for transition relief in the area of automobile emissions standards). 
123. Id at 35. 
124. Id at 32. 
125. See infra notes 127-65 and accompanying text. 
126. See infra notes 130-35, 147-50, 159-62 and accompanying text (detailing the unintended 
social costs associated with certain regulatory changes); see also Sebastian L. Mazzuca, Rent Seeking, 
ENCYCLOPiEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/rent-seeking (last visited Apr. 27, 2020) 
(explaining the concept of rent seeking, in which regulated entities expend resources or compete with 
others to gain an advantage by securing favorable regulation, subsidies, or other government actions that 
work for their benefit or for their competitors' detriment). 
127. Stavins, Vintage-Dif/ferentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 32. 
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only to meet the emissions standards applicable at the time they were 
originally sold) and apply the new regulation only to current or future model 
years.1 28 Of course, such a regulation does nothing to curb pollution from old 
cars. However, because cars will need to be replaced within a relatively short 
period of time, the automobiles on the road will turn over as consumers buy 
new cars,129 and the regulation will eventually address nearly every car in 
use. 
While it may be cheaper for each individual car to include the new 
pollution control equipment at the time of manufacture, a policy of full 
grandfathering for existing cars can undermine both the effectiveness and 
equitability of the program. 30 A study in the 1980s, for example, concluded 
that changes in standards for carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides in 1981 
actually led to an increase in emissions of some pollutants for the first three 
years after implementation, when compared to a modeled scenario with no 
tightened standard.' 3 ' In other words, differentiated regulation delayed the 
effectiveness of the standard, eliminating any short-term benefits, even 
though the policies would reach their desired environmental impact later 
on.1 32 
Measures such as the above example also run counter to nationally and 
globally recognized principles at the heart of environmental law. Under the 
polluter pays principle, "the polluter should ... bear the cost of pollution," 
internalizing the externalities that a person, organization, or state has caused 
or continues to cause. 133 With temporal transition relief, the polluter does not 
pay; rather, new market entrants that are subject to the changed standards or 
requirements shoulder all of the cost of meeting regulatory goals. 134 Although 
differentiated regulation may be less expensive in up-front costs in the 
aggregate, those financial burdens are not shared equally; crafted without 
care, these policies have the effect of absolving those who initially created 
the problem. 13 A Green New Deal provides an opportunity to reframe this 
128. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to "prescribe ... standards applicable to 
the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle 
engines." Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
129. According to a recent study, the average car in the United States is 11.8 years old. Nathan 
Bomey, Old Cars Everywhere: Average Vehicle Age Hits All-Time High, USA TODAY (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2019/06/28/average-vehicle-age-ihs-markit/1593764001/. 
130. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
131. Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case ofAuto Emissions Standards, 
72 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 330 (1982). 
132. Id 
133. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.I 51/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I, princ. 16 (1993). 
134. Huber, supra note 101, at 109. 
135. Id at 109-10. 
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distribution of costs in way that both promotes effective decarbonization 
strategies, as well as social equity. In order to make policy effective, it is 
crucial to avoid this type of redistribution toward historic or existing 
pollution sources, which places them in a more advantageous position than 
new or innovative competitors. 
Second, proponents of differentiated regulation-especially those 
seeking transition relief from its application-raise concerns of fairness 
when laws and policies change. 3 6 If a power plant was built to comply with 
the appropriate legal and regulatory standards in place at the time of planning 
and construction, is it unfair to "change the rules in the middle of the 
game," 3 7 while the plant is in operation and impose new, higher compliance 
costs? 
Property rights advocates have successfully articulated this argument by 
bringing regulatory takings challenges to environmental, land-use, and other 
policies.' 38 In the Supreme Court's often-cited, though convoluted, 
regulatory takings test expressed in Penn Central, one of the key factors the 
Court looked to was the "distinct investment-backed expectations" in making 
a particular use of property. "9 In other words, if a property owner or other 
regulated party has relied on previously applicable policy, courts will 
examine whether legal or regulatory change is constitutionally fair, within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, or whether just compensation is 
required.1 40 
At its extreme, the notion of regulatory takings would grind change to a 
halt-all regulatory change would be limited to the government's ability to 
pay property owners a bounty for any imposition on a laissez-faire regime.141 
It is impossible to consistently draw the line when raw potential for some 
kind of property use or activity transforms into a vested, constitutional, 
compensable right.1 4 2 It is also unclear, under regulatory takings theory, why 
such a distinction should be made in the first place. After all, an efficient 
market should adequately price in the potential for whatever property uses or 
136. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 32. 
137. Huber, supra note 101, at 107. 
138. The concept stretches back nearly a century to Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, in which the Supreme 
Court found a compensable taking when the State of Pennsylvania prohibited subsurface mining of 
anthracite coal underneath residences, seeking to stop the process of subsidence. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
139. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
140. Id; U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation."). 
141. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 24-25 (2003) 
("Demands for compensation ... are often thinly disguised efforts to prevent legal transitions."). 
142. Huber, supra note 101, at 108. 
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development are permitted, as well as an estimate of the risk associated with 
potential regulatory changes.1 43 
More crucially, the discussion over "fairness" to regulated parties during 
transitions presupposes the answer to the question: fairness for whom? 
Focusing on regulated parties' interests overshadows the justice and fairness 
issues for those who are directly impacted by environmental externalities, for 
workers in regulated industries, and for the public at large.1 44 Vested interests 
may see prior destructive practices as "fair" simply because of historical 
tolerance of negative externalities.1 4 5 Policy transitions with differentiated 
regulation may exacerbate, rather than alleviate, socioeconomic or racial 
inequalities.1 4 6  If environmental regulation is only applied to new 
automobiles, power plants, or industrial facilities, the up-front costs may be 
lower in the aggregate and "fair" to existing actors based on their prior 
regulatory expectations. 147 However, providing exemptions (or delaying 
implementation) for existing sources leads to an unequal burden, both in 
compliance costs and in the distribution of negative environmental 
externalities like pollution and impacts on human health.1 48 Regulation only 
of new sources does nothing to alleviate the disproportionate impacts bome 
by communities located close to, downwind from, or downstream from 
143. In criticizing the Penn Central takings test for its failure to measure the fairness of imposing 
the burden of regulatory change on a property owner, Doremus proposed a four-part test that includes, as 
one of the elements, "the extent to which [regulatory] change was foreseeable in advance." Doremus, 
supra note 141, at 31. In other words, if a change that prohibits an activity is foreseeable, that possibility 
should ideally be reflected in the property's market price. Id. at 35. 
144. For decades, the environmental justice movement has focused on the disproportionate burden 
that African-American and other racial minority communities face due to proximity to pollution sources, 
toxic waste, and hazardous materials sites. This impact has been documented in numerous studies. In 
2018, for example, scientists affiliated with the EPA's National Center for Environmental Assessment 
published their finding that African-Americans have a 54% higher burden than the general population in 
exposure to particular matter (PM2.5)-a more pronounced difference than that which can be explained by 
poverty status alone. Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution ofParticulate Matter Emission Sources 
by Race and Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480, 481-82 (2018). 
145. In many circumstances, practices that damage the environment may have been tolerated 
because the impacts were originally low or because the impacts were unknown. As Doremus has 
suggested, policy inertia may lead to the failure of regulations to keep up with changes in technology, 
scientific understanding, availability of information, and social preferences. Doremus, supra note 141, at 
18-24. As environmental impacts increase, the marginal costs may also increase-as in the case of 
endangered species, where early losses of biodiversity may have been insignificant, but present actions 
represent major threats to a species's survival. Id. at 20. In those conditions, it may seem "unfair" to apply 
changed rules, but circumstances may show that the marginal costs of the previously allowed actionjustify 
the change. See id. (discussing biodiversity loss as a changed circumstance). 
146. Id at 14-15. 
147. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 32. 
148. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,095, 10,098 (2006). 
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existing sources.1 49 Differentiated regulation may prevent polluting sources 
from moving to new areas, but by so doing, entrenches historical inequalities 
that disadvantage minority communities and other vulnerable populations. 150 
In addition to environmental justice concerns, the regulatory takings 
doctrine can have a devastating impact on the distribution of whose interests 
"count" in transition policy. The doctrine creates asymmetry between the 
interests of property owners (those who own capital, mineral or grazing 
rights, or real estate subject to new regulations) and the interests of labor, 
working classes, or nearby communities.' 5 ' For example, when courts 
determine that new restrictions on development are a compensable regulatory 
taking, this may force state or local governments to indemnify real estate 
investors, but does not provide any relief for construction workers and other 
contractors whose opportunities also dry up.15 2 The regulatory takings 
doctrine can therefore make capital- or landowner-centered transition relief 
legally necessary-in the name of faimess-while undermining fairness to 
others that lack the constitutional protection. 
In terms of application to the Green New Deal, takings law may play a 
role in at least two ways. To the extent that policies require the early 
retirement of fossil-fuel infrastructure, some power plants and pipelines will 
become stranded assets when their use is restricted or phased out. 15' Takings 
law is relevant to the allocation of the cost of stranded assets in energy law-
distributed by state public utilities commissions (and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission) among utility shareholders, customer ratepayers, 
149. These impacts can be immediate or can remain dormant for a time until additional circumstances 
bring that historic exposure to the surface in a discriminatory manner. In Flint, Michigan, the problem of 
lead pipes was a long-standing issue, as was the pollution of the Flint River. Tim Carmody, How the 
Flint River Got So Toxic, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-
michigan-water-crisis-lead-pollution-history. However, the drinking water crisis occurred when decision-
makers combined the two (running corrosive water through the old pipes, contaminating the water), 
producing disastrous and discriminatory results. 
150. See supra note 144 (citing one of countless studies documenting the fact that African-
Americans and other minority communities bear a disproportionate share of the burden of environmental 
pollution). 
151. The Fifth Amendment limits protection against uncompensated takings for public use to 
"private property." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
152. See supra note 151. 
153. According to a study published in Nature, the world's already existing energy 
infrastructure-even excluding proposed new power plants-if operated as expected for its planned 
lifetime, will significantly exceed the IPCC's estimated carbon budget necessary to avoid likely global 
temperature warming by 1.5oC. Dan Tong et al., Committed Emissions from Existing Energy 
Infrastructure Jeopardize 1.50 C Climate Target, 572 NATURE 373, 375-76 (2019). Therefore, any 
successful effort at full decarbonization would likely include at least some forced early retirement or 
shutdown of existing infrastructure prior to the expiration of its planned useful lifetime, decreasing the 
expected value of existing investments. 
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and the government.1 54 In addition, the construction of new energy and 
transportation infrastructure, such as electricity transmission or train lines, 
implicates the use of eminent domain, compensable as a taking of private 
property for public use. 55 Providing compensation to utility shareholders for 
use restrictions or closure of stranded assets is a transition policy with 
potential advantages for a Green New Deal as an effective and politically 
feasible option that preempts opposition from some sectors that would 
otherwise have a financial incentive to block decarbonization policies. 
However, such compensation can exacerbate inequality by diverting scarce 
transition resources toward capital and away from labor or the general public 
that also bears a financial burden in an energy transition. 
Finally, public choice theory 56 provides an explanation for how political 
pressures favor over-generous transition relief. In industrial settings, existing 
industry, which may oppose regulation generally, is likely to favor "vintage-
differentiated regulation" (i.e., standards that apply more stringently to new 
entrants) because it creates an artificial barrier to entry, making it more 
difficult for new competitors. 5 7 Legislators, concerned about the distribution 
of costs and benefits of regulation in their district-rather than overall costs 
and benefits-may also support differentiated regulation when there are 
asymmetries between the "losers" and potential "winners" in regulatory 
transitions. 158 
Therefore, although economic, legal, and political realities facilitate 
types of transition relief, a deeper exploration of these contributing causes 
also highlights the social and cultural problems that transition policy can 
create. When regulatory transitions are timed to impact concentrated interests 
154. Government approval of utility rates is, at a minimum, constrained by the Takings Clause, 
so as to ensure that utilities receive an adequate rate of return for the public's use of their private property. 
See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 620 (1944) (Reed, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) ("The Congress may fix utility rates in situations subject to federal control without 
regard to any standard except the constitutional standards of due process and for taking private property 
for public use without just compensation."). 
155. Use of federal eminent-domain power in energy infrastructure dates at least to 1947, when 
Congress granted eminent domain authority for natural-gas-pipeline construction. See Act of July 25, 
1947, ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)) (amending § 7 of the Natural 
Gas Act of 1938 to allow the use of eminent domain for natural gas pipelines once a certificate of "public 
convenience and necessity" has been obtained). For further detail, see generally ERIC N. HOLMES, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., LSB 10359, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND? EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER THE NATURAL GAS 
ACT AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/ 
LSB 10359. 
156. See generally PHILIP F. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) ("Public choice theory is a hybrid: the application of the economist's 
methods to the political scientist's subject."). 
157. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 33-34. 
158. Id. at 34. 
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at a specific, cognizable moment-in other words, when transition occurs at 
a defined time or with a defined trigger-those powerful interests have a 
strong incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior,1 59 such as pursuing an 
exemption, pushing back the deadline, or redefining the trigger.1 60 This may 
take the form of lobbying efforts to change deadlines legislatively or 
administratively, as well as efforts to litigate the definition of the trigger.161 
When such concentrated interests win a temporary victory (such as a deadline 
extension or temporal transition relief) and the policy simply delays the 
conflict at which the regulated party's interests are at stake, the rent-seeking 
behavior is likely to occur again until the policy design changes.1 6 2 
Transition relief policies that erect artificial barriers to entry can hinder 
policy effectiveness and may, in some circumstances, stifle innovative 
investment that could lead to better outcomes.1 63 When all costs associated 
with a transition are placed on new actors, and no costs on labor or other 
sectors are recognized, transition relief policy can entrench and exacerbate 
inequality.1 64 Over the long term, this undermines transition objectives of 
cost-effectiveness, fairness, and political palatability.1 65 Green New Deal 
discourse tackles this traditional view of transition theory head-on, offering 
a different approach toward coalition-building to overcome these tendencies. 
As seen in examples discussed below from environmental law as currently 
structured, new coalitions bringing together social justice and environmental 
concerns will be necessary in order to overcome transition policy obstacles 
159. See Mazzuca, supra note 126 (explaining rent-seeking in the context of regulated industries). 
160. As one example, federal renewable-fuel standards are defined year by year, encouraging 
continued battles at the EPA and in the courts about what level or standard will apply each calendar year. 
See Clean Air Act § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2018) (requiring the Administrator to promulgate 
renewable fuel standards on a yearly basis). Data from 2013 to 2018 presented by the Energy Information 
Administration shows how application of the small refinery exemption from the renewable-fuel standard 
has increased sharply under the Trump Administration-another example of how this annual rent-seeking 
behavior works. EPA Small Refinery Exemptions in the Renewable Fuel Standard Explained, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41995. 
161. For example, as discussed infra in Part III.A, under the Clean Air Act, the application of 
New Source Review to modified sources has encouraged a great deal of rulemaking changes by the EPA 
under different presidential administrations, as well as litigation about which types of investments 
regulated industries can make without being classified as a modified source. 
162. One famous (non-environmental) example of this phenomenon of continued rent-seeking is 
Congress's repeated action to extend copyright duration, coincident with the expiration of Disney's 
copyright protection for Mickey Mouse. Steve Schlackman, How Mickey Mouse Keeps Changing 
Copyright Law, ART L.J. (Feb. 15, 2014), https:/alj.artrepreneur.com/mickey-mouse-keeps-changing-
copyright-law/. 
163. Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,097-98. 
164. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 275-76 (explaining that a just transition must address the 
concerns of environmental justice communities and workers in carbon-intensive industries). 
165. Id. 
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and pressures that can ultimately thwart policy efficiency, effectiveness, and 
equitability. 
III. EXAMPLES FROM THE FIRST GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
Modern environmental law in the United States is now 50 years old. The 
major statutory framework for environmental impact assessment,1 66 
biodiversity conservation,167 air pollution, 16 water pollution,1 69 waste 
management,1 70 and toxic substances management' 7 ' was put in place in the 
span of only one decade. At the same time, Congress updated and "greened" 
other major laws regarding the use and management of public lands and 
natural resources.1 72 
Regulatory transition theory described above provides a lens with which 
to analyze the effectiveness of these environmental laws. The statutes of the 
environmental decade started from a recognition that the legal institutions in 
place prior to the 1970s were inadequate to meet the era's environmental 
challenges. 17' Thus, Congress gave the newly formed Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) wide-ranging authority over the United States' air 
pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste, and other environmental 
166. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2018)). 
167. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544). 
168. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q). 
169. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (Clean Water Act) of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388). 
170. Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6981); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675). 
171. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697). 
172. E.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787) (providing a coherent, system-wide scheme for management of 
federal public lands, especially those under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management, and 
prohibiting "unnecessary or undue degradation" of public lands); National Forest Management Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687) (revising the mission and 
purpose of the U.S. Forest Service in managing the National Forests, including a new mandate to prepare 
land and resource management plans for each forest unit). 
173. Keith H. Hirokawa, Disasters and Ecosystem Services Deprivation: From Cuyahoga to the 
Deepwater Horizon, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 543, 545-47 (2011) (discussing Ohio's Cuyahoga River fire and 
Pennsylvania's Donora smog incident, both infamous environmental disasters that spurred Congress to 
enact environmental laws). 
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problems.1 74 At the same time, Congress reformed and updated the mandate 
of the land management agencies, giving them a more direct command to 
consider environmental impacts. 175 
Fifty years of environmental law in the United States have led to 
tremendous success stories, such as the elimination of lead from gasoline, 
sharp decreases in emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in many 
parts of the country, and the cleanup of important waterways.1 76 However, 
many problems remain unsolved or under-addressed; progress in pollution 
control and the improvement of environmental and human well-being has 
been uneven.1 77 This Part draws on earlier literature on the regulatory failures 
of major environmental statutes, viewing them through the lens of regulatory 
transition theory, and addressing the extent to which the environmental 
transitions brought about by these statutes were motivated by or consistent 
with principles of equity, effectiveness, efficiency, and political feasibility. 
Policy design in the first generation of environmental law-spurred by 
considerations of cost, perceptions of fairness, and politics-has contributed 
to the environmental failures experienced today.7 8  Learning from those 
histories provides valuable lessons for present discourse about designing a 
Green New Deal and how to construct the next generation of environmental 
law and policy. 
174. The Origins of EPA, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/history/origins-epa (last updated 
Nov. 19, 2018). 
175. All federal agencies are required to follow the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Endangered Species Act. See National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (referring 
to "all agencies of the Federal Government"); Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) 
(applying consultation requirements and responsibilities to "[e]ach Federal agency"). As to the main land-
management agencies, for example, Congress updated the U.S. Forest Service's mandate by requiring an 
extensive land and resource management planning process: plans must take into account "economic and 
environmental" considerations and must "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities," among 
other requirements. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A)-(B). Other examples of environmentally-conscious 
changes to federal land management decisionmaking are found in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 and other contemporary statutes, such as the so-called Redwood Amendment 
to the National Park Service's Organic Act, in which Congress "reaffirm[ed]" a commitment to the 
conservation of national parks for "the common benefit of all the people of the United States." Act of 
Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 166 (codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(2)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
176. Timothy J. Sullivan et al., Air Pollution Success Stories in the United States: The Value of 
Long-Term Observations, 84 ENVTL. SC. & POL'Y 69, 69-70 (2018). 
177. See, e.g., Mikati et al., supra note 144, at 480-83 (reporting that, compared to other racial 
groups, African-Americans face a disproportionate burden of particulate matter air pollution). 
178. See infra text accompanying notes 195-98 (describing how the Clean Air Act's 
grandfathering provisions for stationary sources have enabled old coal plants to continue operating and 
polluting for decades beyond their expected lifespan). 
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A. Stationary Sources: Stay Put and Keep Polluting 
The most cited story in the history of environmental regulatory 
transitions involves the Clean Air Act and the regulation of stationary 
sources.17 9 The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 created a process for states 
to develop state implementation plans (SIPs) that guide each state toward the 
attainment of nationwide standards set by the federal EPA for certain 
common air pollutants.s0 The Amendments required that each state's plan 
"includes a procedure . . . for review (prior to construction or modification) 
of the location of new sources" of pollution to which certain provisions of 
the Act apply.' 
In 1977, Congress significantly expanded the Clean Air Act's stationary 
source requirements. 8 2 In particular, the 1977 amendments established a 
preconstruction permit-review program for new and modified "major 
emitting facilit[ies]," run by the EPA or approved state regulatory 
agencies.' 8 3 The permit-review program, commonly known as New Source 
Review (NSR), 8 4 includes a public hearing process and imposes significant 
substantive requirements-the new facility may not cause the area to exceed 
ambient air quality standards and must meet even more stringent standards 
in nonattainment areas, i.e., areas with excessive pollutant levels.8 5 New 
facilities-in areas with air quality in attainment with national standards-
are required to install the "best available control technology" (BACT) for 
each pollutant, based on a case-by-case, source-specific determination by 
179. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 101, at 93 (citing the Clean Air Act's grandfathering policy as 
an infamous case of transition relief); accord Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, 
at 49; accord Nash & Revesz, supra note 101, at 1678. 
180. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410). This section of the Clean Air Act is commonly referred to as 
"section 110." 
181. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110(a)(2)(D) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(D)). 
182. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 §§ 110-29, Pub. L. No. 95-95, tit. 1,91 Stat. 685, 686-
745 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515). 
183. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 165(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)). 
A "major emitting facility" is any stationary source with the "potential to emit" either 250 or 100 tons of 
a given air pollutant, depending on the category of the source. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 169 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)). 
184. Two separate statutory programs Nonattainment New Source Review for regions in excess 
of national ambient air quality standards and Prevention of Significant Deterioration in regions currently 
meeting standards-are collectively referred to as New Source Review (NSR). Nash & Revesz, supra 
note 101, at 1682-83. 
185. Clean Air Act §§ 110(j), 165(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(j), 7475(a)(3). 
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state agencies under plans approved by the EPA (or a determination by the 
EPA itself in states where the EPA has not delegated this authority).18 6 
The NSR program is a tremendously significant example of 
grandfathering-permanent transition relief. The 1977 amendments drew 
a bright line: the NSR process and pollution control technology requirement 
would only apply to sources that begin construction after the Act took 
effect."' Existing sources are exempt so long as they stay put: NSR will only 
kick in if the source is "modifi[ed]"-a statutorily defined term that refers to 
"any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary 
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such 
source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously 
emitted."1 89 
Four decades of NSR implementation have yielded mixed results and 
have exposed several problems with the statutory and regulatory design. 
Literature on the Clean Air Act's application to the power plant sector 
highlights the ways in which overly generous transition policy results in 
"perverse incentives" for regulated parties.1 90 Just as regulatory transition 
theory would predict, grandfathering in the NSR program has made pollution 
reduction more costly and less efficient in the long run. 191 Further, the sharp 
distinction between new and existing has not been fair-it has been bad for 
186. Clean Air Act § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). The Clean Air Act defines "best available 
control technology" with reference to the types of considerations the relevant agency must make in 
determining how the technological standard will apply to an individual source. "Best available control 
technology" is 
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each 
pollutant subject to regulation . . . which the permitting authority, on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts 
and other costs, determines is achievable . . . through application of production 
processes and available methods, systems, and techniques . . . for control of 
each such pollutant. 
Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
187. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,095-96 (explaining that grandfathering creates 
incentives for older sources to keep operating); accord Huber, supra note 101, at 93 n.9. 
188. Clean Air Act § 165(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (applying the permit requirement only to any 
"major emitting facility on which construction is commenced after August 7, 1977"). 
189. Clean Air Act § 11 1(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4). The "modification" part of the "new 
source" definition in 42 U.S.C. § 7411(2) is incorporated by reference in § 7479; for any "construction" 
of "modification[s]" that began after 1977, the NSR provisions of the statute apply. Clean Air Act 
§ 169(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) ("The term 'construction' when used in connection with any source 
or facility, includes the modification . . . of any source or facility."). 
190. See Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,096 (charging the Clean Air Act's grandfathering policy with 
creating "perverse incentives" for operators of old plants); accord Nash & Revesz, supra note 101, at 
1733; accord Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 52-53. 
191. See Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,097-98 ("The net effect of grandfathering is that newer, 
cleaner plants are sometimes left unbuilt. Older, dirtier plants keep running."). 
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everyone other than the owners of pre-1977 existing facilities, exacerbating 
inequalities that were in place when these facilities were built.1 92 
Here, two major problems merit discussion. First, the NSR distinction 
between new and existing sources created a powerful incentive to keep old 
power plants in operation for a long time-much longer than the lifespan 
originally anticipated at the time of their construction.' 93 Second, the 
ambiguous nature of the modification concept-and its importance in 
triggering the full expense of NSR for grandfathered plants-predictably led 
to decades of litigation and lobbying as to what constitutes a modification.1 94 
As Shi-Ling Hsu notes, significant studies showed that grandfathering 
for a single coal-fired power plant could represent an asset worth as much as 
$150 million for its owner in competition with a new power plant that would 
be required to install emission-control equipment. 195 Allowing existing 
sources to continue to emit at high levels, while placing the burden of 
environmental compliance only on new sources, is inherently unfair. Despite 
articulated justifications, it acts as "a simple transfer payment to those with 
grandfathered plants from those that lack them."1 96 The operation of the 
statute leaves the viability of this $150 million asset up to the owner's 
decision about whether to construct a new facility. 197 This boost to the value 
of the old plant means the owner will be willing to expend significant 
resources to maintain it and to avoid the classification of any maintenance or 
upgrades to it as a modification. 98 
192. See id. (observing that, while grandfathering has been perceived by laypeople as fair, it is 
fundamentally unfair). 
193. Id at 10,097 (noting that over one-third of power plants operating today are over 50 years 
old). 
194. The issue continues today. In 2018, as part of the EPA's proposal to repeal the Obama-era 
Clean Power Plan, the EPA proposed significant regulatory revisions exempting the types of 
modifications that its rule was calling for (i.e., heat-rate efficiency improvements at power plants) from 
NSR, even if the modifications resulted in running those plants at a higher capacity, emitting greater levels 
of pollutants. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source 
Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 44,774-83 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018). The EPA ultimately backed 
off on including this explosive change in the already-controversial Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule 
when it was finalized in 2019; however, the EPA has still indicated its plans to pursue NSR reforms. See 
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,521 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60) ("[T]he EPA intends to take final action on the proposed NSR reforms in a separate final action at 
a later date."). 
195. Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,096 & n. 11. Hsu cites a study from the National Research Council 
showing the estimated costs of SO 2 and NOx controls. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON CHANGES IN NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES OF AIR 
POLLUTANTS 111-12 (2005). 
196. Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,098. 
197. Id at 10,096. 
198. Id 
760 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 44:723 
Randy A. Nelson, Tom Tietenburg & Michael R. Donihue's empirical 
test of 44 privately-owned utilities from 1969 to 1983 provides further 
evidence for how this dynamic has played out in practice.' 99 They found that 
for these utilities "environmental regulations increased the average age of 
fossil-fueled steam generating plants by an average of 3.29 years." 2 00 The 
effect continued in subsequent decades, as the average age of coal plants in 
the United States increased.20 ' 
The hard distinction between existing versus new and modified sources 
has created a powerful incentive to litigate and lobby with regard to what 
constitutes a modification.202 Taking the example of a plant with an 
exemption from NSR regulation valued at $150 million-because there has 
been no clear, foreseeable rule about what constitutes a modification and will 
push the facility over the line from no regulation to expensive, onerous 
requirements-the owner has a strong financial interest in obscuring what is 
going on at the plant, lobbying for exemptions, or fighting enforcement 
through litigation.203 Financial and other resources expended in doing so are 
inefficient drags on environmental compliance and weaken the impact of the 
regulatory transition.204 
199. Randy A. Nelson, Tom Tietenburg & Michael R. Donihue, Differential Environmental 
Regulation: Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STATS. 368, 
373 (1993). 
200. Id. 
201. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported at the end of 2016 that the average 
age of coal-fired power plants in the United States was 39 years. Roughly half of the plants in operation 
date to before the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments. Most Coal Plants in the United States Were Built 
Before 1990, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail. 
php?id=30812. 
202. Nash and Revesz chronicle the history of regulatory changes and litigation on the issue of 
modification. Nash & Revesz, supra note 101, at 1681-1707. The EPA has long recognized an exemption 
for the routine maintenance and repair of stationary sources (referred to as the "RMRR" exemption). Id. 
at 1689. However, this simply moved the fight to what is considered "routine." During the George W. 
Bush Administration, the EPA sought to blow open this exemption by defining RMRR to include any 
investment up to 20% of the plant's value-a change which could have essentially allowed plant owners 
to extend the life of sources indefinitely by turning over the facility gradually and maintaining its exempt 
status. Id. at 1697; Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,100. The D.C. Circuit invalidated this rule change. New 
York v. EPA, 433 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). According to Hsu, this problem of ambiguity in the 
definition is never going to be solved. Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,102. In other words, so long as there is 
permanent grandfathering of existing sources, the program will continue to encourage this sort of gaming 
to avoid regulation. 
203. Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,096. 
204. That is, facility owners spend resources to preserve regulatory exemptions that could be spent 
on anything from improving labor conditions to research and development of new, more efficient 
technology. 
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Decarbonization in the Green New Deal will require complete 
decarbonization of the electricity-generation sector, 205 but it will also require 
closure and transitions in the operation of other stationary source categories, 
including oil refineries, petrochemical manufacturing facilities, and other 
operations that create inequitable environmental burdens on their 
surrounding communities. Many coal-fired plants have closed in the past 
several years, with a large portion of these over 40 years old; however, most 
analysts attribute these closures to the cost-competitiveness of natural gas, 
renewables, and other generation, rather than to regulation.206 To the extent 
that regulation has driven coal plant closures, rules other than NSR have been 
responsible, such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards instituted by the 
EPA under the Obama Administration, which, unlike NSR, apply also to 
existing sources.207 Thus, the Green New Deal will need to regulate 
stationary sources differently, with a reoriented legal framework toward 
equity, effectiveness, efficiency, and political feasibility. The NSR program, 
while a valuable tool in existing law, is undermined by its inability to address 
the oldest, most significant pollution sources.20 8 
205. Or at least near-complete decarbonization, with net decarbonization if generation includes 
the capture and storage of CO 2 or another means of offsetting minimal remaining emissions. 
206. See, e.g., INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, RECORD DROP IN U.S. COAL-FIRED 
CAPACITY LIKELY IN 2018 (2018), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Record-Drop-in-U.S.-
Coal-Fired-Capacity-in-2018_October2018.pdf (predicting that coal power plants will continue to close 
in the face of low prices for renewable and natural-gas generation). Of course, the replacement of coal-
fired power plants with natural-gas-fired generation presents its own transition problem, as it merely 
reduces, rather than eliminates, conventional and climate pollutants. Brad Plumer, As Coal Fades in the 
U.S., Natural Gas Becomes the Climate Battleground, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/climate/natural-gas-renewables-fight.html (explaining that while 
natural gas produces only half the CO 2 of coal for each megawatt-hour of electricity generated, it still 
significantly contributes to GHG emissions). 
207. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9303, 9303 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63) (promulgating stringent standards for mercury emissions that have arguably led to 
coal power plant closures). The rule was reviewed in Michigan v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court 
remanded the rule to the EPA for failure to consider the potential costs of regulation at the point of 
deciding when to regulate. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015). The EPA ultimately kept the 
essence of the rule in place after making a new determination that regulation of toxic air pollutants from 
the power sector is "appropriate and necessary." See Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) (2018) (specifying the standard the EPA must satisfy when it promulgates rules for 
electric-utility steam-generating units). Coal power and air-sourced mercury emissions have decreased 
significantly under the rule. Sonal Patel, How Did MATS Affect U.S. Coal Generation?, POWER (Oct. 4, 
2018), https://www.powermag.com/how-did-mats-affect-u-s-coal-generation/. 
208. As a caveat to the above discussion, a significant part of the story of NSR's failures has been 
a lack of consistent enforcement. No policy design change could completely make enforcement issues go 
away; the ability to avoid NSR by undertaking significant modifications without regulation had a lot to 
do with lax enforcement in the first place. Beginning in 1999, when the Clinton Administration finally 
decided to crack down on and go after the worst violators, the dynamic changed to lobbying and litigation 
about exemptions such as the RMRR rule. See Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement, U.S. EPA, 
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B. Loitering in the CAFE: Regulation of Car Emissions and Fuel Efficiency 
Transportation is now the largest contributor of GHG emissions in the 
United States.2 09 Yet, conventional pollution from automobiles-including 
nitrogen oxides that contribute to hazardous ground-level ozone, as well as 
lead, carbon monoxide, and toxic air pollutants-has been a major target of 
environmental regulation for decades. 210 Recognizing the lack of effective 
federal clean air policy, the State of California first began regulating vehicle 
emissions in the 1960s. 2 11 Later, Congress stepped in, giving authority to the 
EPA to create uniform federal limits on pollution from cars under Title II of 
the Clean Air Act, while leaving in place California's ability to enact more 
stringent rules.212 
Energy policy led to a parallel track of car regulation that began in the 
1970s. At the height of the oil-price crisis after OPEC nations cut production, 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) created the initial federal 
requirement for fuel-economy standards.2 13 Set by the Department of 
Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard requires auto 
manufacturers to meet a minimum level of fuel efficiency across an average 
of all the manufacturer's vehicles.214 The initial justification for CAFE 
standards was as an energy-saving measure, rather than an environmental 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/coal-fired-power-plant-enforcement (last visited Apr. 27, 2020) 
(listing enforcement cases). Enforcement efforts were continued under the Bush Administration, but have 
been accompanied by never-ending litigation about definitions for which you can never have a clear, 
applies-in-every-situation rule. See Hsu, supra note 148, at 10,101-02 (noting that the Bush 
Administration's NSR policy led to seemingly endless legal wrangling). 
209. U.S. EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas, supra note 58 (indicating that, in 2018, 28% of U.S. 
GHG emissions came from transportation, while 27% came from electricity generation, 22% from 
industry, 12% from commercial and residential sources, and 10% from agriculture). The New York Times 
interactive feature from October 2019 shows the increase in transport-related CO 2 emissions for each 
metropolitan area in the country since 1990. See Nadja Popovich & Denise Lu, The Most Detailed Map 
ofAuto Emissions in America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/ 
10/10/climate/driving-emissions-map.html?module=inline. 
210. E.g., Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (creating emission standards for motor vehicles). 
211. Nicholas Bryner & Meredith Hankins, Why California Gets to Write Its Own Auto Emissions 
Standards: 5 Questions Answered, CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2018), http://theconversation.com/why-
california-gets-to-write-its-own-auto-emissions-standards-5-questions-answered-94379. 
212. Clean Air Act §§ 202, 209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 7543. When California demonstrates that it 
has compelling and extraordinary circumstances that require stringent mobile-source regulation, and so 
long as those regulations are at least as stringent as federal requirements, the EPA is required to grant 
California a waiver to implement its own rule, despite the Clean Air Act's general preemption of state-
level vehicle-emissions standards. Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C § 7543(b). 
213. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201). 
214. 49 U.S.C. § 32902. 
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5 control.2 1 Congress updated and affirmed this energy independence-energy 
security justification for updated regulation during the Bush Administration 
in the 2005 Energy Policy Act and the 2007 Energy Independence and 
Security Act, as oil prices rose sharply during the middle of that decade.216 
Fuel-economy and tailpipe-emissions regulation have converged in the 
context of climate mitigation. Following the Supreme Court's decision in 
EPA,2 17 Massachusetts v. the EPA issued its finding that GHGs endanger 
public health and welfare, leading to a statutory obligation under Title II of 
the Clean Air Act to place limits on vehicle GHG emissions. 2 18 Under the 
Obama Administration, the EPA coordinated its standard for new vehicles 
(expressed in grams of CO 2 emitted per mile) with NHTSA's fuel-economy 
standard (expressed in miles per gallon of gasoline).219 
215. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (directing the Secretary of Transportation to consider energy 
conservation in setting fuel-economy standards). 
216. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) mandated 
updated CAFE standards for cars beginning in 2011, leading to "at least" a 35 mpg average by 2020, with 
averages after 2020 to be set at the "maximum feasible average fuel economy standard" determined by 
NHTSA for each model year, as per the rest of the statutory section. Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, sec. 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)). 
The EISA also included a dramatic increase in the Renewable Fuel Standard as a measure to reduce U.S. 
reliance on oil imports and provide a dedicated market for corn-based ethanol fuel. See Clean Air Act 
§ 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (requiring the Administrator to promulgate regulations to increase the 
amount of ethanol in fuel). 
217. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007) (interpreting Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), to require the EPA to regulate carbon emissions if they endanger the public). 
218. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
219. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012). The Obama Administration's 
agencies set the CAFE standard and corresponding GHG standard at the equivalent of 54.5 mpg for new 
cars in model year 2025.Id. at 62,627. In 2018, the EPA and the NHTSA proposed a significant weakening 
of the standard, with efficiency increases to 36.9 mpg by 2020 and remaining flat after that year. Safer 
Affordable Fuel Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Proposed Rule for Model Years 2021-2026, 83 Fed. Reg. 
42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018). On April 30, 2020, the EPA and the NHTSA published a final SAFE 
Rule in the Federal Register. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model 
Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600). The final rule increases fuel economy standards by 1.5% per year through 
2026, reaching a projected 40.5 mpg by 2030-a greater increase in efficiency than the proposal, but far 
less than the Obama-era rule. See id at 24,175, 24,176. In September 2019, the agencies finalized 
separately a portion of the proposed rule, revoking California's waiver to implement its more stringent 
vehicle emissions regulations and reinterpreting the EPCA to preempt any GHG emissions standard set 
by the state. Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 
Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85 and 86). California, a coalition of 
other states, and environmental groups have all sued the agencies to block this action; the EPA has never 
revoked a previously granted California waiver, and several scholars, including the Author, have argued 
that the EPA and the NHTSA's actions and interpretations are unlawful. See, e.g., Nicholas Bryner & 
Meredith Hankins, Trump Administration and California Are on Collision Course over Vehicle 
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One key difference for policy on automobiles as opposed to the 
regulation of large stationary sources of air pollution is the shorter timeframe 
for investment and turnover of emissions sources. While fossil-fuel-fired 
power plants are built with an expected lifetime of 30 years or more, 
passenger automobiles tend to last on the road for an average of roughly 15 
years. 220 Cars are shorter-term investments, with technology that more 
quickly becomes obsolete and with emissions split across hundreds of 
millions of tailpipes across the country, making it much less practical to 
retrofit existing cars to improve pollution controls or fuel efficiency. 22 1 
Notwithstanding these differences, vintage-differentiated regulation of 
motor vehicle emissions has led to similar issues, with detrimental effects on 
the effectiveness and equitable impacts of air pollution regulation. 22 2 Under 
the Clean Air Act, the EPA regulates emissions for new motor vehicles and 
can set technology-forcing standards to lower emissions in the future; 
however, the regulation of new vehicles means that older vehicles still on the 
road are grandfathered into compliance based on the standards in effect at the 
time the vehicle was manufactured.2 23 
Economists have studied the effects of these asymmetric standards for 
several decades. In 1982, Howard Gruenspecht studied the EPA's new 
vehicle-emissions standards for carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) and the effects that the regulatory transition would have on emissions 
and on vehicle lifespans.224 Gruenspecht's model compared the 1981 
standards to two different hypothetical scenarios: one in which there was no 
new CO and NOx standard for new vehicles; and another in which the 
Emissions Rules, CONVERSATION (Aug. 2, 2018), https:/theconversation.com/trump-administration-and-
california-are-on-collision-course-over-vehicle-emissions-rules-100574 (commenting on the Trump 
Administration's attempt to revoke California's waiver to establish its own tailpipe emissions standards); 
accord ANN E. CARLSON, MEREDITH HANKINS & JULIA STEIN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y, SHIFTING 
GEARS: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S REVERSAL ON CALIFORNIA'S CLEAN AIR ACT WAIVER (2019), 
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CA-Car-Standards-IB-2019.pdf/. 
220. See Todd Woody, Most Coal-Fired Power Plants in the US Are Nearing Retirement Age, 
QUARTZ (Mar. 12, 2013), https://qz.com/61423/coal-fired-power-plants-near-retirement/ (reporting that 
the average lifespan of a coal-fired power plant is 40 years); Antonio Bento, Kevin Roth & Yiou Zuo, 
Vehicle Lifetime and Scrappage Behavior: Trends in the U.S. Used Car Market, 39 ENERGY J. 159, 178 
(2018). 
221. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Regulation, supra note 101, at 43-44. Stavins explains 
additional differences: the only regulations that apply to existing cars are emissions inspections; 
essentially, regulation is designed only to ensure that the pollution control devices as manufactured are 
still working, rather than impose new standards once the car is on the roads. Id at 45. 
222. Id at 32. 
223. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added) ("The [EPA] 
Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) ... standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle 
engines . . . ."). 
224. Gruenspecht, supra note 131. 
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standard was removed and replaced with a cash bounty available for 15-year-
225 old cars.
Because compliance with the emissions standard increased the purchase 
cost of cars, Gruenspecht found that the policy reduced new car sales and 
increased the lifespan of older, more heavily polluting cars. 22 6 As a result, 
Gruenspecht concluded that hydrocarbon and CO emissions for three years 
out (in 1984) would actually be higher under the EPA's stricter 1981 policy 
than under either of the two alternative scenarios (NOx emissions, unlike the 
other two pollutants, would slightly decrease under the EPA's policy). 2 27 
Essentially, it would take five to seven years for the policy to result in deeper 
emissions reductions than what could be achieved without any regulation-
as the oldest cars were replaced, even without a tighter new standard-or 
with a bounty program.228 
Thus, even in a sector of energy consumption that sees relatively 
frequent turnover in investment, a blanket grandfathering policy for all 
existing assets can delay and reduce the effectiveness of a regulatory 
transition. 229 The health impacts of transportation-related pollution that are 
exacerbated by these policy delays are more acutely felt by communities that 
live close to highways and other high-traffic areas.23 0 Concentration of air 
pollutants from transportation are disproportionately higher in predominantly 
black and Hispanic communities than in white communities, raising 
significant equity issues with the design of mobile-source air pollution 
regulation.23 ' 
The CAFE standard was effective in improving nationwide fuel 
efficiency in its first decade. 23 2 However, from the early 1980s to mid-2000s, 
225. Id at 329. 
226. Id at 329-30. 
227. Id at 330. 
228. Id 
229. Id at 330-31. 
230. In 2010, the Health Effects Institute's review of epidemiological literature detailed the public 
health impacts of living within 300 to 500 meters of a major road, documenting increased incidences of 
childhood asthma and other respiratory diseases. HEALTH EFFECTS INST., TRAFFIC-RELATED AIR 
POLLUTION: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 
10 (2010), https://www.healtheffects.org/system/files/SR17TrafficReview.pdf. 
231. See Lara P. Clark, Dylan B. Millet & Julian D. Marshall, Changes in Transportation-Related 
Air Pollution Exposures by Race-Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status: Outdoor Nitrogen Dioxide in the 
United States in 2000 and 2010, 125 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1, 8 (2017). Although the study found 
significant declines from 2000 to 2010 in the number of people exposed to NO 2 levels above international 
health guidelines, as well as some closing of the gap between minority and white populations' exposure 
to the pollutant, the authors found that "nonwhites were three times as likely as whites to live in a block 
group above the WHO guideline [for NO2] in 2000, and 2.5 times as likely in 2010." Id 
232. U.S. EPA, 2018 EPA AUTOMOTIVE TRENDS REPORT: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, FUEL 
ECONOMY, AND TECHNOLOGY SINCE 1975, at 6 (2019), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100W 
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average fuel economy in the United States actually decreased: the CAFE 
standard remained constant, fuel prices were generally low, and 
manufacturers shifted to (and consumers bought) heavier, more powerful 
vehicles-switching away from sedans and toward SUVs. 233 Since 2004, fuel 
efficiency has increased sharply in an era of concern about high oil prices 
and energy security, followed by the implementation of the Obama 
Administration's joint EPA-NHTSA rule on fuel economy and GHG 
emissions. 23 4 Despite these fuel efficiency increases nationwide, vehicle 
miles traveled and transportation GHG emissions continue to increase, both 
in absolute terms, as well as per capita levels, 235 and the Trump 
Administration's new fuel economy rule for 2021 through 2026 cars has 
severely weakened the regulatory push for lower emissions beyond 2020.236 
As with motor vehicle emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, the 
CAFE standard applies only to new vehicles, set prospectively for 
manufacturers across all of their vehicles for a given model year. 23 7 The 
statutory scheme for fuel economy provides no way to address vehicles 
currently on the road or to encourage switching to newer, more efficient cars. 
Nearly 50 years' experience with this regulatory model for fuel 
efficiency shows weaknesses in efficiency, effectiveness, and equity as to the 
impacts of these standards. 238 Further, the politicization of the standard under 
the Trump Administration demonstrates the fragility of the "energy security" 
portion of the political coalition that had enacted stricter rules in 2005 and 
2007.239 All this is to suggest that the current model will not be sufficient to 
meet the goal of the Green New Deal of electrifying and decarbonizing 
transportation. A Green New Deal will require different or additional law to 
5C2.PDF?Dockey=P100W5C2.PDF (reporting that fuel efficiency improved until the 1980s). 
233. Id. at D-5. 
234. Id. 
235. See Popovich & Lu, supra note 209 (showing the trend in absolute and per capita 
transportation-related GHG emissions by metro area from 1990 to 2017-a time period marked by 
increases in both measures in nearly every part of the United States). 
236. See generally The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 
2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600); see also supra note 219 (providing a brief outline of fuel economy standards 
under the Trump Administration). 
237. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2018). 
At least 18 months before the beginning of each model year, the Secretary of 
Transportation shall prescribe by regulation average fuel economy standards 
for automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in that model year. Each 
standard shall be the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that the 
Secretary decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year. 
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). 
238. See supra notes 224-36 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 219. 
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facilitate more than incremental change in transportation efficiency and will 
need to do so with political coalition-building in mind. 
The above two examples from the Clean Air Act-stationary and mobile 
sources-illustrate the applicability of regulatory transition theory in 
environmental law.24 0 These Clean Air Act transitions demonstrate how cost 
considerations, administrability, and perceptions of fairness contribute to 
undermine or delay regulatory effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. 
The types of distinctions made in the NSR program-i.e., grandfathering 
in existing infrastructure and investments-are not unique to pollution 
control and can be seen in a variety of policy contexts relevant to the Green 
New Deal. One critical example is the application of building codes. Whether 
for environmental and energy-efficiency or for other purposes, such as fire 
and earthquake safety, accessibility, etc., building codes govern the 
construction of new residential, commercial, or industrial buildings but 
exempt or grandfather in previous construction. 24 ' For buildings, this 
grandfathering creates long-term problems for climate and environmental 
action under a Green New Deal. Whereas automobiles, or even most power 
plants, are likely to be replaced as worn out or obsolete within this half-
century, residential homes built today could be expected to stand through the 
end of the 21st century or longer.24 2 
IV. DESIGNING LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN A GREEN NEW DEAL 
The Green New Deal envisions a new decade of transitions in the United 
States, marked by rapid change from electricity, transportation, industry, and 
agriculture dependent on fossil-fuel combustion to a decarbonized 
economy. 243 The "New Deal" element in the phrase indicates an emphasis on 
government-driven investment and policy to employ workers, distribute the 
benefits of decarbonization to vulnerable or marginalized groups and 
communities, and ease the burden of the massive multisectoral transitions in 
the Green New Deal.244 
240. See supra notes 179-239 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, tit. 28, ch. 10, § 101.4.1 (LexisNexis 2020) 
(exempting existing buildings, as a general rule, from energy conservation requirements); id. tit. 28, ch. 7, 
§ 1101.3 (exempting existing buildings from accessibility requirements, unless they undergo significant 
alterations). 
242. For discussion of this issue and the long-term expected lifespan of residential buildings as 
compared to other types of assets or infrastructure, see WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, 
supra note 66. 
243. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., at 6-10 (2019) (calling for a ten-year mobilization to 
accomplish the Green New Deal's goals). 
244. Supra text accompanying note 48. 
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The application of regulatory transition theory and the experiences 
associated with environmental law during the past 50 years point toward the 
need for new solutions in a Green New Deal that will address transition 
problems. As described earlier, temporal transition relief is frequently the 
result of financial and political pressures. 245 However, overly generous relief 
in those transitions could undermine the effectiveness of regulatory 
transitions envisioned in the Green New Deal and could exacerbate existing 
inequalities. 
Without making specific policy choices that need to be made in 
designing the Green New Deal, there are some basic outcomes fundamental 
to the idea. These include, at a minimum, rapid expansion of renewable 
energy generation and electricity transmission infrastructure, closure of fossil 
fuel-fired power plants, and major changes to U.S. transportation systems 
(including the prioritization of mass transit, as well as a transition away from 
gasoline-powered cars and trucks).246 Overcoming the typical transition 
policy pressures will be critical to enable a Green New Deal that meets the 
goals of effectiveness, efficacy, and equity in a politically feasible way. 
A. Solutions to Transition Problems 
Economic and regulatory solutions are available to deal with the 
common problems in transitions seen in the Clean Air Act and other 
environmental laws. Some of these solutions are intuitive, but may be 
politically difficult; other solutions may help effectiveness, but bear financial 
costs; yet others ignore socioeconomic and distributional justice impacts. 
No Grandfathering. First, in response to the tendency toward temporal 
transition relief,2 47 Green New Deal law and policy can be structured without 
grandfathering, such that climate and environmental standards apply equally 
to new and old infrastructure. For example, once a new standard is put in 
place to limit pollutant emissions from power plants, the requirement would 
apply to all plants equally, regardless of location or age. While this shift in 
the application of environmental laws could create backlash and criticisms of 
"unfairness," it is important to note that knowledge about climate impacts in 
particular, and the emission of GHGs, is not a new phenomenon. 248 The 
245. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text. 
246. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 66, at xiv (outlining the major 
transitions needed to accomplish decarbonization). 
247. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. 
248. Dr. James Hansen's famous congressional testimony on climate change was given in 1988, 
now over three decades ago. See Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-
expert-tells-senate.html. 
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unfairness argument loses some potency, given that major economic actors 
have been aware of information with regard to their GHG contribution for 
quite some time.249 
Mandated Retrofitting. Paired with grandfathering could be regulatory 
requirements that existing infrastructure, buildings, or assets be retrofitted to 
improve environmental performance and efficiency or to mitigate GHG 
emissions. As noted earlier, there is a need to tailor policy based on the 
expected lifespan of equipment, assets, or infrastructure and based on the 
relative expense of retrofitting.250 One size does not fit all here: for some 
sectors, such as personal automobiles, retrofitting may be infeasible. 
Electrification of transportation over a short period of time, as the Green New 
Deal envisions, might be better accomplished by focusing on the production 
of new electric transportation, rather than requiring the retrofitting of 
gasoline-powered vehicles with battery-powered drivetrains. 251 However, for 
residential buildings, retrofitting would prove much more significant. 25 2 
Given that virtually all of the homes and apartment buildings people live in 
could be expected to still be standing by the middle of the century, Green 
New Deal goals could never be accomplished in any reasonable time frame 
without massive retrofitting efforts for energy efficiency, fuel switching, and 
other changes. 
Transition Phase-In. Less severe than a blanket policy of no 
grandfathering may be a firm phase-in schedule for regulatory transitions. 
For example, the retirement of polluting infrastructure could be tied to set 
time periods or to related policy timeframes, such as amortization schedules 
for capital investments in tax policy2 53-indicating that the owners of the 
asset should not have any further expectation of value in maintaining its use. 
Of course, any phase-in period schedule will tend to incentivize 
regulated parties to seek continual extensions or additional ways to maximize 
249. See, e.g., Shannon Hall, Exxon Knew About Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago, SC. AM. 
(Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-change-almost-
40-years-ago/ (reporting on an investigation that found Exxon understood the link between GHGs and 
climate change as early as 1977 and recalling that Exxon has spent the intervening years denying and 
refuting climate science). 
250. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
251. See WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DDPP TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 71-72 (noting that 
long-lived infrastructure requires retrofitting to meet new regulatory standards, whereas with short-lived 
equipment it is more economical to focus on new production). 
252. Id. 
253. That is, if an entity is able to claim tax benefits for the depreciation of a facility or pollution 
source over a 20-year period, then the law could require the facility to either close at the end of that 
amortization period or comply with current environmental requirements, to ensure that the grandfather 
exception does not lead to a windfall or artificially extend the useful life of the facility. 
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and prolong the value of their assets or investments.254 For example, if a new 
statute or regulation in 2020 required all natural gas-fired power plants to 
close by 2030, the decade-long delay would ease political opposition to the 
measure in the short term, but as the deadline approaches, regulated 
industries would have a strong incentive to lobby to extend or eliminate the 
deadline. There may be alternative, more successful ways to design a statute 
or policy to overcome these problems. A policy could require the oldest, 
highest-polluting, or least efficient 5% of such plants to close each year for 
the next 20 years. The time delay could make the policy more politically 
palatable, and the gradual phase-in would ensure that no single year becomes 
significant enough in terms of cost to make the issue salient. 
Market-Based Solutions. Economists, environmentalists, policymakers, 
and advocates have clashed in recent years as to the desirability of market-
based solutions as an alternative or a complement to prescriptive 
environmental regulation.255 As a form of financial transition relief, market 
tools, such as taxes, subsidies, tradeable quotas, and emissions cap-and-trade 
regimes, can distribute the burden of transition policies across different 
sectors and among new and old pollution sources.25 6 Imposing fees or taxes 
tied to pollution emissions or environmental outcomes, rather than regulation 
tied to control equipment technology, could be used to address the 
grandfathering problem and level the playing field for new market entrants, 
if broadly applied.257 
Economists favor market-based environmental policies to further the 
policy goal of efficiency. Once an environmental standard or objective is 
identified (e.g., the appropriate allowable total of pollution emissions over a 
given time period), market-based policies are intended to provide flexibility 
such that market principles and economic cost-benefit considerations drive 
regulated parties' behavior.258 Efficiency can, in turn, advance the goal of 
efficacy in environmental policymaking by maximizing the environmental 
254. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. 
255. For an analysis of early experiences with market-based environmental regulation, see Robert 
N. Stavins, Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 355-435 (Karl-Garan Miler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policy]. 
256. See Huber, supra note 101, at 101-03 (categorizing types of financial relief and giving 
examples); see also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
257. A Pigouvian tax, named after economist Arthur Pigou, adds a charge based on the 
externalities of an activity-such as environmental pollution or contribution to climate change-that are 
not captured in the market price. Externalities: Pigouvian Taxes, ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/economics-brief/2017/08/19/pigouvian-taxes. 
258. See generally Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policy, supra note 255 (describing the 
benefits of market-based environmental regulation and analyzing examples from around the world). 
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benefit that can be gained with scarce resources.259 Limiting costs may help 
political coalition-building among fiscally conservative decisionmakers. 
However, market-based solutions are subject to rent-seeking behavior by 
creating a financial stake in exemptions, allowances, or special rules in 
market-based regulations. 26 0 Further, market-driven approaches frequently 
raise environmental justice and equity concerns, because they tend to focus 
on aggregate cost efficiency in policy implementation, rather than 
considering the distributive impacts of pollution and other environmental 
problems on disadvantaged or marginalized communities.26 ' 
In addition to the political economy critique of market-based 
environmental regulation, environmental justice advocates raise concerns 
that issues of equity-not adequately reflected in market-based 
decisionmaking because they have not traditionally been considered 
financially quantifiable-are swept under the rug with a presumption that 
market-based solutions lead to efficient outcomes.262 If a company that 
operates a polluting source must internalize the economic externalities of 
pollution, but can allocate those costs (whether internally or externally via 
trading), it will be likely to do so in a way that minimizes costs. This can lead 
to the phenomenon of pollution hot spots where pollution remains cheaper to 
259. Id. 
260. In a cap-and-trade system, setting the level of allowances that can be used to meet the cap is 
subject to this pressure. Carbon dioxide cap-and-trade systems to date, such as the European Union's 
Emission Trading Scheme (E.U. ETS) began with the grandfathering of existing sources by granting them 
free allowances based on historical emissions. Edwin Woerdman, Oscar Couwenberg & Andries Nentjes, 
Energy Prices andEmissions Trading: Windfall Profits from Grandfathering?, 28 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 185, 
185-86 (2009). This was done, ostensibly, as a measure to increase the political palatability of the proposal 
for energy companies. Granting free allowances, however, leads to "windfall profits" for regulated entities 
when the opportunity costs of using the allowances are passed on to consumers. Id. at 186. In their look 
at early experiences under the E.U. ETS, Woerdman et al. conclude that only auctioning the allowances 
(i.e., not pre-determining the price or tightening the cap) avoids the windfall profits issue. Id. at 197. 
261. In California, the debate about the environmental justice impacts of the state's GHG 
emissions cap-and-trade program became a focal point for the state legislature in 2017. Sean Hecht, The 
Future of California's Greenhouse Gas Cap and Trade Program After 2020: A Conversation, LEGAL 
PLANET (May 9, 2017), https:/legal-planet.org/2017/05/09/the-future-of-californias-greenhouse-gas-
cap-and-trade-program-after-2020-a-conversation/. Environmental justice advocates opposed parts of the 
reauthorization of the program that were supported by state Democratic Party leadership and enacted by 
the Legislature. Id. The blog Legal Planet posted a series of viewpoints on the state's cap-and-trade 
program that illustrate the economist-environmental justice divide on the policy. Id. 
262. See Amy Vanderwarker & Kay Cuajunco, Equity at the Center: SB 775 and AB 378 Create 
New Path Towards More Equitable, Effective Climate Policy, LEGAL PLANET (May 12, 2017), 
https://legal-planet.org/2017/05/12/guest-bloggers-amy-vanderwarker-and-kay-cuajunco-equity-at-the-
center-sb-775-and-ab-378-create-new-path/ (highlighting that California's cap-and-trade system works 
fine for GHGs which have a global effect, but ignores co-occurring toxic air pollutants with local effects, 
meaning that efficient allocation of carbon emissions may cause a disproportionate allocation of burdens 
to public health and quality of life). 
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3 externalize. In the case of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain trading program, 
early studies showed that compliance led to emission cuts from the worst 
polluters, having a "cooling" effect on already existing hot spots. 2 64 
However, environmental justice advocates remain concerned about the 
impact climate cap-and-trade schemes are having with regard to hot spots of 
co-pollutants that are emitted by major sources along with GHG (but 
unregulated by GHG-specific caps).265 
For these political and equity-based reasons, the Green New Deal 
generally eschews market-based solutions to climate and other 
environmental problems.2 66 The Green New Deal emphasizes the connection 
between environmental and socioeconomic challenges.267 Thus, Green New 
Deal proponents are skeptical of the approach over the past three decades to 
rely on markets, unless paired with other regulation or specifically designed 
in a way to drive equitable outcomes.268 
B. Intuitive Policy Meets Difficult Politics 
Transition problems in implementing a Green New Deal proposal are 
not difficult to imagine. Grandfathering and other overly generous forms of 
transition relief lead to inefficient, ineffective, and inequitable results that 
could undermine the objectives of any Green New Deal effort. Policy 
solutions to address these transition problems are easily identifiable, at least 
in general terms-including, as discussed above, a prohibition on 
grandfathering, mandated retrofitting, and phased-in regulation that avoids 
regulatory bottlenecks or trigger points that raise the stakes for concentrated 
263. In climate regulation, hot spots are not a concern, because common GHGs disperse widely 
in the atmosphere, and the climate impacts are global, rather than local. This is in contrast to pollutants, 
such as mercury or other toxic air pollutants, that have localized environmental impacts, meaning that 
communities near concentrated pollution sources will experience disproportionate harmful effects. See, 
e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 
49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 221 (2012) (comparing the George W. Bush Administration's widely 
criticized proposal for a cap-and-trade scheme for mercury emissions with proposals for cap-and-trade 
GHG regulation). 
264. Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SO 2 Hot Spots-Good News from the Acid Rain 
Program, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 954, 955 (2000). 
265. Vanderwarker & Cuajunco, supra note 262. 
266. Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Do We Need the Green New Deal?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/opinion/climate-change-green-new-deal.html (presenting both 
sides of the debate over the Green New Deal as a tool for combating climate change, including the 
effectiveness of market and non-market strategies for controlling carbon emissions). 
267. Id. 
268. It is worth noting that Woerdman et al.'s study of the E.U. ETS recommends that a cap-and-
trade best designed to avoid the windfall profits problem is one that offsets the cost of pollution allowances 
with cuts to labor (payroll) taxes, conveying the message that pollution costs money while labor is 
encouraged. Woerdman, Couwenberg & Nenties, supra note 260, at 198. 
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interests lobbying to delay or roll back changes. However, the economic and 
political conditions that create pressure for transition relief2 69 are likely to 
present significant political hurdles to adopting forward-looking regulatory 
policy under a Green New Deal. 
As climate science has become more fine-tuned in the past several years, 
some commentators have gravitated toward the concept of a carbon budget-
the amount of global GHG emissions likely to keep global temperatures 
below the 1.5 or 20C thresholds.2 7 0 Equitable measures of how to allocate any 
such global budget would leave most of these amounts to developing 
countries that are still in the process of providing secure, affordable, and 
reliable energy. 27' Regardless of any allocation, a recent study in Nature 
demonstrated that, at a global level, existing and proposed fossil-fuel energy 
infrastructure, even if used only until the end of the infrastructure's expected 
lifespan at the time of construction, already accounts for roughly 846 metric 
gigatons of C02-equivalent (depending on a variety of factors). 2 72 This total 
alone is well above the 420 to 580 metric gigatons of GHG emissions that 
are likely left in the 1.5 0 C carbon budget, and more than half of what is left 
in a 20C budget.273 
In other words, the most up-to-date scientific studies and models suggest 
that to avoid catastrophic damage from climate change, international and 
domestic policy must limit not only the GHG emissions associated with 
projects and activities in the future, but also mandate the early retirement of 
some existing infrastructure.274 Any substantial component in a Green New 
269. Supra Part II.B. 
270. See generally, e.g., Joeri Rogelj et al., Estimating and Tracking the Remaining Carbon 
Budgetfor Stringent Climate Targets, 571 NATURE 335 (2019) (comparing and analyzing several different 
attempts to quantify a carbon budget consistent with 1.50 or 20C targets). 
271. Considering historical GHG emissions, the United States (and the rest of the industrialized 
world) have used far more than an equitable share of the GHGs released since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution. See MARCIA ROCHA ET AL., HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE-FROM 
COUNTRIES EMISSIONS TO CONTRIBUTION TO TEMPERATURE INCREASE 8 (2015), https://www.climate 
analytics.org/media/historical responsibility report nov 2015.pdf (showing pie charts of historical 
GHG emissions, with the United States responsible for 20% of global GHG emissions from 1850 to 
2012-the highest share of any country). 
272. See generally Dan Tong et al., Committed Emissions from Existing Energy Infrastructure 
Jeopardize 1.5 0C Target, 572 NATURE 373 (2019). The paper's authors estimate 658 metric gigatons (a 
range of 226 to 1,479) from already-built infrastructure, 41 % of which comes from infrastructure in China. 
"Committed emissions" from proposed projects represent an additional 188 metric gigatons (a range of 
37 to 427). Id. 
273. Id 
274. See id. at 376. The development of rapidly scaled-up and widespread negative emissions 
technologies could offset some of this need, but the quantity of "committed emissions" would render any 
such solutions partial and marginal; the limited storage capacity for long-term sequestration of carbon 
means negative emissions technology most likely cannot balance out the entirety of our overcommitted 
fossil-fuel infrastructure. 
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Deal toward early retirement or closure of electricity generation, industrial 
facilities, and transportation infrastructure will raise additional, complex 
legal and political challenges. 
In this vein, Green New Deal legal and policy design can draw on the 
experiences of public utilities law in previous transitions, such as the 
transition away from nuclear power construction in the late 1970s and 80s. 
Due to safety concerns (and changing economic projections about the 
demand for electricity generation), utilities scrapped many planned nuclear 
plants throughout the 1980s. 275 Variations in state public utilities law led to 
differences in how those sunk, stranded costs were absorbed-either by 
utility shareholders or by consumers (i.e., electricity ratepayers). In 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, the Supreme Court addressed this scenario, 
ultimately denying a utility's constitutional takings claim against 
Pennsylvania's "used and useful" standard that prohibited the utility from 
applying the costs of a canceled project to its customers.276 The Court did not 
mandate as a matter of federal constitutional law any particular way to handle 
this cost dispute, but the case raises issues that could recur if a Green New 
Deal forces utilities or other infrastructure owners to prematurely close 
facilities or abandon current plans.277 
Making the intuitive legal design choices in a Green New Deal that avoid 
transition pitfalls-avoiding grandfathering and mandating retrofitting-
requires incorporating those choices into a package that overcomes political 
coalition-building barriers. In other words, because grandfathering has 
political benefits (protecting existing interests and advancing a "fairness" 
policy framing),278 policy that avoids grandfathering must be constructed in 
a way that overcomes the political liabilities with a different set of 
advantages. 
Green New Deal ideas can turn the tables on political coalitions that have 
favored over-generous transition relief, and instead foster a stronger, more 
robust regulatory transition toward low-carbon infrastructure. Rather than 
pairing pro-regulation interests with the interests of existing industry to 
create barriers to entry, a Green New Deal plan can appeal to both labor and 
275. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 302 (1989) (mentioning the history 
that led up to the cancelation of the nuclear plant at issue in the case). 
276. Id. at 301-02. 
277. In a more recent application of this problem, South Carolina utility regulators are still dealing 
with the aftermath of the unfinished V.C. Summer nuclear project, canceled in 2017 after expenditures of 
roughly $9 billion. Brad Plumer, U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-
in-south-carolina.html. 
278. See supra note 123 (identifying fairness and political palatability as two of the three reasons 
governments provide transition relief). 
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environmental interests by funding job-heavy infrastructure retrofitting and 
rebuilding projects. To meet goals of equitability for both displaced workers 
and those disproportionately impacted by environmental harms, transition 
relief can focus on financial transitions, rather than temporal relief that delays 
and undermines the effectiveness of regulatory changes. This financial relief 
could be directed both toward labor sectors and toward capital-asset owners, 
in the form of payments that incentivize early retirement rather than subsidies 
for prolonged use of fossil fuels.279 
A final lesson from earlier environmental laws that can be applied in 
designing a Green New Deal is crafting law and policy with enforcement and 
enforceability in mind.28 0 Recent scholarship on environmental compliance 
and enforcement has shown how choices about institutional design, 
monitoring programs, and rules about transparency influence compliance 
rates, as well as the level of public participation in implementing changes.28 ' 
Making these choices wisely may lead to more effective, efficient, and 
equitable results, without the political challenge of setting more stringent 
requirements or standards. 
CONCLUSION 
The Green New Deal idea is ambitious in its scope and in its goal: an 
economy-wide transition that integrates environmental and socioeconomic 
interests in addressing the crises of climate change, environmental pollution, 
poverty, and discrimination.282 Precise policy plans are in flux, but the Green 
New Deal name has stuck and has significantly influenced environmental and 
83 industrial policy platforms of 2020 presidential candidates, 2 as well as state 
and local-level actions. 
279. On the extent to which elimination of fossil-fuel subsidies would likely drive decreases in 
GHG emissions, see Peter Erickson et al., Why Fossil Fuel Producer Subsidies Matter, NATURE, Feb. 6, 
2020, at El. But see generally Jessica Jewell et al., Limited Emission Reductions from Fuel Subsidy 
Removal Except in Energy-Exporting Regions, 554 NATURE 229 (2018) (calculating a lesser degree of 
reductions due to differences in the nature and level of fossil-fuel subsidies and taxes in different 
countries). 
280. See, e.g., NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (LeRoy 
C. Paddock & Jessica A. Wentz eds., 2014) (discussing the concept of "rules with compliance built in"). 
281. See, e.g., LeRoy C. Paddock, David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Introduction to IV 
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1-17 (Michael Faure ed., 2017) (introducing a volume on developments in the 
enforcement of environmental law written by contributing scholars and policymakers from around the 
world). 
282. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
283. See, e.g., Where Democrats Stand: Climate Change, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/climate-change/green-new-deal/ (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2020) (showing statements from several Democratic candidates in response to the 
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The problems associated with transition relief point to a central 
challenge: how to craft a Green New Deal that garners support from existing 
actors, without undermining the long-term effectiveness of the plan. The 
growing literature on just transitions highlights the imperative to regard 
8 4 social, economic, and environmental transitions as interrelated. 2 Rather 
than complicating the feasibility of environmental policy, the Green New 
Deal represents the idea that aligning these interests-i.e., bringing labor and 
environmental justice interests together with supporters of strong climate 
action-can lead to a different coalition that can avoid the pitfalls of the first 
generation of environmental laws. 
The long-term dimension of climate change-with global impacts felt 
over centuries, rather than days, months, or years-raises the issue of 
intergenerational equity. Perhaps the one certainty in climate change is that 
change will come, whether in significant legal and policy changes to manage 
an effective response to mitigate climate change, or as a result of warming 
and sea-level rise that threaten to disrupt and harm billions of people, present 
and future. As a cautionary note, it is worth remembering that "[t]he 
judgment of posterity has not been kind to America's record of worker 
transition in other periods of economic upheaval." 285 Designing a Green New 
Deal is a critical opportunity to apply the lessons from those transitions and 
to do better. 
question of whether they support the Green New Deal Resolution). The candidacy of Washington 
Governor Jay Inslee has driven significant innovation in climate-policy planning, as he made climate 
change the signature issue during his brief campaign; other candidates have since drawn on his framework. 
See Zoya Teirstein, A Q&A with the Policy Wonks Who Wrote Jay Inslee's Climate Plans, GRIST 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https:/grist.org/article/a-qa-with-the-policy-wonks-who-wrote-jay-inslees-climate-
plans/ (explaining the lasting impact of the framework on the election). 
284. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 77. 
285. John Copeland Nagle, The War on Coal, 5 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 21, 28 (2017) 
(alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD MARTIN, COAL WARS: THE FUTURE OF ENERGY AND THE FATE 
OF THE PLANET 35 (2015)). 
